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Abstract
My dissertation examines the corporate diversification strategy of vertical integration.
Vertical integration refers to the organizational structure in which divisions within the firm are
integrated along the supply chain. I examine the advantages and disadvantages associated with
vertical integration in two chapters.
In Chapter 2, I model how inter-divisional spillover effects mitigate internal capital
market (ICM) inefficiencies. The model shows that the spillover effect helps align the objectives
of division managers and the objective of the CEO and the firm, and thus facilitates efficient
capital allocation at equilibrium. Empirically, I measure the size of the spillover effect by the
degree of vertical integration of the firm. I present evidence that higher level of vertical
integration is associated with more efficient internal capital markets.
In Chapter 3, I show that vertically integrated firms are relatively lower valued firms.
Using a vertical integration coefficient (VIC), constructed with Industry Benchmark InputOutput accounts data, provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), I find that
compared to laterally integrated firms, vertical integration is associated with a significant firm
value discount of approximately 1.56%. Even more strikingly, compared to firms located in the
lowest VIC quartile, firms located in the highest VIC quartile exhibit a significant larger discount
of approximately 3.34%. I find that there are two important sources of this additional discount:
lower profit margins and more cross-subsidization.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
The focus of my dissertation is corporate vertical integration. While the effects of
corporate diversification have been extensively discussed in the literature, the comparison
between different diversification strategies has received much less attention. The central topics
of discussion in the corporate diversification literature are the efficiency of internal capital
market (ICM) within conglomerates and the valuation effects of diversification. And my
dissertation investigates these two research questions in the context of corporate vertical
integration.
By design, the information advantages possessed by ICM partially solve the
overinvestment problem and financial constraints faced by stand-alone firms in the external
capital market, and thus could facilitate efficient resource allocation. However, there are a large
amount of theoretical arguments and empirical evidence on the inefficiencies of ICM.
Specifically, the misalignment between division managers’ self-interests and firm interests leads
the managers to influence corporate resource allocation to be in favor of their own divisions,
through various value destroying behaviors, which results in misallocation of corporate capital at
equilibrium.
However, what is neglected in existing studies is that conglomerates can mitigate the
conflict of interest between division managers and the firm by adopting a particular
diversification strategy. Specifically, I propose vertical integration, in which divisions within the
firm are integrated along the supply chain. In Chapter 2 of my dissertation “Vertical Integration
to Mitigate Internal Capital Market Inefficiencies: Theory and Evidence”, I first develop a
theoretical model that demonstrates the mechanism of how vertical integration aligns division
managers’ self-interests and firm interests, and encourages division managers to pursue actions
that optimize equilibrium capital allocation within the firm. In addition, I construct a measure of
vertical integration and provide empirical evidence of lower cash flow- investment sensitivity
and higher innovative efficiency under vertical integration, both of which indicate higher ICM
1

efficiency. The important contribution of this study to the literature is that it highlights the
importance of diversification strategy, a subject that has been largely neglected in the literature.
It provides insights on the advantages of vertical integration based on theoretical grounds, and
important practical implications of how conglomerates can utilize these attributes to enhance
corporate allocation efficiency.
Chapter 3 of my dissertation continues the discussion of vertical integration by examining
its valuation effects. The literature identifies numerous factors that contribute to the
“diversification discount”, such as inefficient ICM, cross-subsidization, and higher cost incurred
in the bankruptcy procedure, etc. Since firm value is not influenced by a single factor, the more
efficient ICM within vertically integrated firms may not guarantee a higher firm value. In the
chapter “Why Does Vertical Integration Destroy Firm Value?”, I first document a further
discount associated with vertical integration, versus lateral integration, and then explore the
sources of this discount. Evidence shows that vertical integration leads to significantly lower
profit margin, due to internal transactions, and greater cross-subsidization.
The two chapters in my dissertation are complementary in theme. Together, they provide
a comprehensive picture of the pros and cons associated with the vertical integration strategy.
They also shed light on the important question of when firms should adopt a vertically integrated
structure. One can interpret the evidence in the two essays as to suggest that vertical integration
is value-enhancing through improving allocation efficiency, but value-destroying through
lowering operating efficiency. Although not directly tested in my dissertation, practically
speaking, the importance of allocation efficiency may outweigh that of operating efficiency for
firms at a growth stage, where firms face various investment opportunities associated with great
a level of information asymmetry. Alternatively, operating efficiency may dominate allocation
efficiency when firm enters the mature stage. My dissertation, therefore, provides justifications
for adopting dynamic diversification strategies to fit the different stages of the business life
cycle.

2

Chapter 2: Vertical Integration to Mitigate Internal Capital Market
Inefficiencies
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Coase’s (1937) treatise on the boundary of firms is the foundation of a large amount of
literature and debate among financial economists. One of the important questions originating
from Coase’s work, which academicians have wrestled with for a substantial amount of time, is
the role the internal capital market (ICM from hereon) plays in corporate resource allocation. By
design, ICM possesses information and monitoring advantages, compared to the external capital
market (e.g., Alchian, 1969; Weston, 1970; Williamson, 1970, 1975, 1986) and therefore, should
allow for more efficient resource allocation within the firm. This attribute of ICM has been
shown to be especially desirable with the existence of information asymmetry (Hubbard and
Palia, 1999; Peyer, 2002) and higher cost of external financing (Hovakimian, 2011; Khanna and
Tice, 2001; Matsusaka and Nanda, 2002; and Yan, 2006). Gertner, Scharfstein, and Stein (1994)
and Stein (1997, 2003) theoretically support the efficiency of ICM, and show that such efficiency
is derived from the control rights and “winner picking” function that the corporate headquarters
maintains and performs.
In contrast, there is also a large amount of empirical evidence of inefficient resource
allocation within the ICM (e.g., Lamont, 1997; Palia, 1999; Rajan, Servaes and Zingales, 2000;
Scharfstein and Stein; 1998; Seru, 2014; Shin and Stulz, 1998). Williamson (1975) and
Donaldson (1984) suggest that the cause of ICM inefficiencies is “internal competition”. In a
credit-constrained multi-division firm, the extent to which a division gets funded depends not
only on the absolute value of its own projects, but also on the value of these projects relative to
3

the investment opportunities of other divisions of the firm. This creates internal competition for
corporate resources. While the CEO’s incentives are to allocate the limited capital to the
“winner”, this conflicts with the private benefits of the division managers who do not have the
best investment opportunity in the firm. Such misalignment of interests can lead to manipulations
of the allocation process by the division managers through various value-destroying behaviors,
given the information asymmetry that exists between the divisions and the headquarters.
Examples of these value destroying behaviors are influence costs (Meyer, Milgrom, and Roberts,
1992), rent-seeking (Scharfstein and Stein, 2000), and power-grabbing (Rajan et al., 2000), all of
which can hinder the CEO’s “winner picking”.
If the internal conflict of interest is the cause of resource misallocation, such
inefficiencies should be mitigated if the agents’ incentives are more aligned. In this study, I
propose such a mechanism that unifies the objectives of the corporate internal agents.
Specifically, I propose the spillover effect, which allows one division’s production to benefit
from other divisions’ investments. I demonstrate in a model that, without the spillover effect, the
optimums of the division managers are independent of the optimum of the CEO and the firm,
and their attempts to influence capital allocation to be in favor of their own divisions can result
in inefficiencies at equilibrium. After the spillover effect is introduced, productions of different
divisions become interrelated, and the optimums of the agents converge with the optimum of the
firm, which reduces the managers’ need to influence the capital allocation process, and facilitates
efficient equilibrium outcome. I also relate my model to existing theories that support the
inefficient view of ICM, and show that the spillover effect can be generally applied to address
the different causes of misallocation explained by these theories.

4

Since the spillover effect allows one division’s production to benefit from other
divisions’ investments, these divisions must be operationally related. The most common
operational linkage within a firm is the inter-divisional supplier-customer relation. The
diversification strategy that creates this linkage is vertical integration, in which the divisions are
integrated along the supply chain and inter-divisional transactions are an integral part of the
firm’s operations. Due to the inter-divisional supplier-customer relation and the frequent internal
transactions under vertical integration, costs and revenues of the divisions are positively related.
As a result, a successful investment made by one division can have a positive spillover effect on
the production of another division along the supply chain. The idea that vertical integration
positively relates the productions of different divisions is consistent with the findings in Cohen
and Frazzini (2008), who show that supplier-customer economic links are useful in predicting
future returns. Therefore, I construct a vertical integration coefficient (VIC), using the IO
accounts of dollar flows between all industries in the U.S. economy provided by the Bureau of
Economic Analysis (BEA), and use VIC to proxy for the size of the spillover effect.
Empirically, I test the efficiency of ICM in two ways. First, following Shin and Stulz
(1998), I examine the extent to which investments of small divisions in diversified firms depend
on the divisions’ own cash flows and investment prospects, and whether this dependence varies
with the level of vertical integration. If ICM is efficient in resource allocation, investments of
small divisions should depend less on the divisions’ own cash flows, when the relative prospects
of these investment projects are better among all divisions of the firm. On the other hand, if ICM
is inefficient, the dependence of small divisions’ investments on their own cash flows should not
vary with the relative prospects of their investment opportunities. The test results show that, as
the level of vertical integration increases, the dependence of small divisions’ investments on their
5

own cash flows decreases, when investment prospects of these divisions are the best among all
the investment opportunities faced by the firm. Specifically, when holding VIC and cash flows
constant, having the best investment opportunity within the firm lowers the cash flow sensitivity
of the smallest segment by 0.88%. And there is an additional 0.29% decrease in cash flow
sensitivity for firms located in the third VIC quartile of the sample, compared to firms in the first
VIC quartile, which magnifies the effect of having the best investment project by about 33%.
This evidence is consistent with the prediction of the model that the spillover effect associated
with vertical integration increases ICM efficiency.
As a second test of the model, I examine the influence of diversification strategy on ICM
efficiency, using R&D investment outcomes. Seru (2014) argues that R&D investments are
characterized by significant information asymmetry between the researchers (or divisions) and
outside evaluators (i.e., corporate headquarters). In the presence of information asymmetry, the
division researchers have an incentive to overstate their investment prospects to corporate
headquarters. This information manipulation may, in turn, lead corporate headquarters to either
allocate scarce capital to mediocre projects, or to refrain from embarking on novel research in the
first place. Seru (2014) finds lower innovative efficiency in conglomerates, indicating inefficient
resource allocation by the ICM. Following the intuition presented in his paper, I examine
whether innovative efficiency in multi-division firms varies with the level of vertical integration.
I find that, given the level of R&D investment, the number of patents produced increases as the
level of vertical integration increases. Holding R&D intensity constant, moving from the first to
the third VIC quartile in the innovation sample leads to 0.24 more patents produced, which is
equivalent to an approximately 12% increase in innovative efficiency. As higher innovative
efficiency indicates higher ICM efficiency, this result, again, is in line with the main model
6

prediction that vertical integration creates potential spillover and increases ICM efficiency.
Importantly, the results pertaining to investment cash flow sensitivity and innovative efficiency
are robust when I use a subsample of firms with 3 or fewer divisions, and when I employ an
alternative measure of vertical integration.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the model. Section 2.3
describes the data and the samples used in the empirical tests. Sections 2.4 and 2.5 present the
empirical tests of the model, and in Section 2.6 I report the results of the robustness analyses.
Finally, Section 2.7 concludes.

7

2.2 THE MODEL
2.2.1 Structural and Financial Setting
I start by describing the structural and financial settings of the model. The model
concerns a two-division firm that features three types of agents: two division managers, the CEO
and outside investors. The CEO has no financial resource of her own, but is endowed control
rights by outside investors, and thus has full authority in allocating corporate investment capital
across the two divisions. Both division managers and the CEO derive private benefits from the
assets they oversee. Specifically, division managers’ private benefits equal a fraction, ρ, of the
production outputs of their own divisions; and the CEO’s private benefits are a fraction, δ, of the
total production outputs of the firm. Both ρ and δ are positive and less than one. The division
managers and the CEO are self-interested, in that their objectives are to maximize their private
benefits. As the CEO maximizes her private benefits through maximizing the firm’s production
outputs, her interests align with the interests of the firm and outside investors. In contrast, the
division managers maximize their private benefits through maximizing the production outputs of
their own divisions, which, as I show later, may not be in the best interests of the firm and
outside investors. While the production outputs are costless verifiable, the agents’ private
benefits are non-contractible. In every production cycle t, the firm is endowed with investment
capital 𝐶𝑓,𝑡 , which is fully allocated to divisions i and j, and thus 𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐶𝑗,𝑡 = 𝐶𝑓,𝑡 .

8

2.2.2 Investment and Production
The firm has a production function 𝑘 (𝐶𝑡 ), where 𝐶𝑡 is the capital invested in period t, and

𝑘(. ) is an increasing and concave function, with 𝑘 ′ (. ) > 0, 𝑘 ′ (0) = ∞, and 𝑘′′ (. ) < 0. Within each

production cycle t, the production outputs equal 𝜃𝑡 𝑘(𝐶𝑡 ), where 𝜃𝑡 measures the productivity of

the assets in place in period t. 𝜃𝑡 can also be considered as the investment state of period t. I

assume that 𝜃1, 𝜃2 , 𝜃3 ,… are independently and identically distributed and drawn from a finite
interval, [𝜃𝐿 , 𝜃𝐻 ], which is common knowledge to all three types of agents. Furthermore, the

productivities of the two divisions, 𝜃𝑖,𝑡 and 𝜃𝑗,𝑡 are independent, and are only directly observable

to their own division managers before any production occurs.

9

2.2.3 Information Process and Capital Allocation
To understand the information and capital allocation process within the firm, consider a
production cycle t. Without losing generality, I describe the timeline of the events using division
i. Since the CEO does not have direct observation of 𝜃𝑖,𝑡 , she forms an estimation, 𝜃�𝚤,𝑡 , of division

i's productivity, based on a signal received from manager i. This gives manager i the opportunity
to exert her influence on capital allocation, in order to maximize the production outputs of
division i, and her private benefits. Specifically, at the beginning of period t, division manager i
first observes 𝜃𝑖,𝑡 and decides the level of influence to exert, 𝐼𝑖,𝑡 . She then reports to the CEO

information regarding her division’s productivity in the form of a signal, 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑖,𝑡 , where
𝐼𝑖,𝑡 ε [0, I]. 𝐼𝑖,𝑡 cannot be directly observed by the CEO or outside investors before production.

However, once production occurs and outputs are verified, the CEO will be able detect the level
of influence that has been exerted. The concept of division managers’ influence is captured in

several previous models that explain the inefficiencies of the ICM. For example, in the influence
cost model in Meyer et al. (1992), managers of divisions facing the threat of layoffs might
attempt to prevent downsizing by exaggerating their units’ prospects in order to gain access to
corporate resources. In some respects, the managers’ influence efforts are also similar to the rentseeking activities modeled in Stein and Scharfstein (2000), which increase the bargaining power
of the division managers during salary negotiations with the CEO.
After receiving the signal, the CEO forms her own estimation of the actual productivity
of the division i. In particular, being aware of the manager i’s tendency to exert influence, the
CEO estimates a conjectured level of influence �
𝐼𝚤,𝑡 . This estimation is based on the detected

influence of the previous period. Specifically, �
𝐼𝚤,𝑡 = 𝑓�𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 �, where 𝑓(. ) is a non-decreasing
10

function known only to the CEO. Subsequently, the CEO downgrades the signal received from
manager i, by her own estimation of manager i's influence efforts, thus 𝜃�𝚤,𝑡 = 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐼�
𝚤,𝑡 = 𝜃𝑖,𝑡 +
�
�
�
𝐼𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐼�
𝚤,𝑡 . Similarly, 𝜃𝚥,𝑡 = 𝑆𝑗,𝑡 − 𝐼𝚥,𝑡 = 𝜃𝑗,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑗,𝑡 − 𝐼𝚥,𝑡 . The CEO’s capital allocation decision is a

function of her estimated relative productivities of the two divisions: in period t, the capital
𝜃�

allocated to division i, 𝐶𝑖,𝑡 , is given by the function, 𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑔(𝜃�𝚤,1 ), where 𝑔’(. ) > 0. The CEO’s
𝚥,1

decision function is not crucial in the model, but its implication is consistent with the CEO’s
optimum shown later, which is that the CEO will always allocate more capital to the division
with relatively higher estimated productivity. The timeline of the events is shown in Figure 2.1

11

2.2.3.1 The Case with No Spillover Effects

2.2.3.1.1 CEO’s Optimum
In the case with no spillover effects between divisions i and j, I first examine the CEO’s
optimization problem. Since the CEO’s private benefits align with the firm’s interests, the
optimum shown here is also the efficient capital allocation for the firm. Specifically, the CEO
and firm’s optimum is given by the following proposition.
𝜃�

𝜃

Proposition 1: Optimal capital allocation for the CEO and the firm requires 𝜃�𝚥,𝑡 = 𝜃𝑗,𝑡 .
𝚤,𝑡

𝑖,𝑡

Proof: In period t, the CEO’s objective is to maximize her private benefits, given by:
𝑈𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝑡 = 𝛿�𝜃𝑖,𝑡 𝑘�𝐶𝑖,𝑡 � + 𝜃𝑗,𝑡 𝑘�𝐶𝑗,𝑡 ��

(1)

𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐶𝑗,𝑡 = 𝐶𝑓,𝑡

(2)

𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝑡 = 𝛿�𝜃𝑖,𝑡 𝑘�𝐶𝑖,𝑡 � + 𝜃𝑗,𝑡 𝑘�𝐶𝑗,𝑡 �� − 𝜆𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝑡 �𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐶𝑗,𝑡 −𝐶𝑓,𝑡 �

(3)

subject to the fixed capital constraint:

The associated Lagrangian of this constrained maximization is:

And the first-order conditions of this Lagrangian are:

𝜕𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝑡
= 𝛿𝜃𝑖,𝑡 𝑘 ′ �𝐶𝑖,𝑡 � − 𝜆𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝑡 = 0
𝜕𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝑡
= 𝛿𝛿𝑗,𝑡 𝑘 ′ �𝐶𝑗,𝑡 � − 𝜆𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝑡 = 0
𝜕𝐶𝑗,𝑡
𝜕𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝑡
= 𝐶𝑓,𝑡 − 𝐶𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐶𝑗,𝑡 = 0
𝜕𝜆𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝑡

∗
∗
Define 𝐶𝑖,𝑡
and 𝐶𝑗,𝑡
as the optimal capital allocation in period t. At the optimum:

12

(4)

(5)

(6)

∗
𝑘′(𝐶𝑖,𝑡
) 𝜃𝑗,𝑡
∗ =
𝑘′(𝐶𝑗,𝑡 ) 𝜃𝑖,𝑡

(7)

Intuitively, (7) implies that, at the optimal capital allocation, the ratio of marginal
productivities of capital of the two divisions equals the reverse ratio the two divisions’
productivities. Given that 𝑘 ′ (. ) > 0 and 𝑘 ′′ (. ) < 0, the optimum requires that the division with

relatively higher productivity gets the bigger share of corporate capital, which is consistent with
the CEO’s capital allocation decision function described above.
Given that the CEO does not directly observe 𝜃𝑖,𝑡 and 𝜃𝑗,𝑡 , her capital allocation decision

�
will be based on her estimations of the productivities, 𝜃�
𝚤,𝑡 and 𝜃𝚥,𝑡 , thus we have:
𝑘′(𝐶𝑖,𝑡 )
=
𝑘′(𝐶𝑗,𝑡 )

𝜃�
𝚥,𝑡
�
𝜃𝚤,𝑡

(8)

Therefore, the sufficient and necessary condition for capital allocation, 𝐶𝑖,𝑡 and 𝐶𝑗,𝑡 , to be optimal
is:

𝜃�
𝜃𝑗,𝑡
𝚥,𝑡
=
𝜃𝑖,𝑡
𝜃�
𝚤,𝑡

(9)

The implication of Proposition 1 is that, in order for the CEO to allocate capital
efficiently, her estimated relative productivity must equal to the actual relative productivity.
Equation (9) reflects an idea similar to the concept of “winner picking” explained in Stein
(1997). The corporate headquarters ranks order all investment opportunities to make capital
allocation decision. And when doing such relative ranking, absolute errors in the CEO’s
estimations of investment prospects do not necessarily lead to inefficient capital allocation. As
long as the estimation errors are correlated across all projects, the estimated relative ranking is
the same as the actual relative ranking, and capital allocation is efficient. For example, suppose
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the CEO overestimates the productivities of both divisions by 10%, which means 𝜃�𝚤,𝑡 =

110%𝜃𝑖,𝑡 , and 𝜃�
𝚥,𝑡 = 110%𝜃𝑗,𝑡 . It is easy to see that equation (9) is still satisfied in that case.
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2.2.3.1.2 Equilibrium
In this section, I incorporate the managers’ influence activities, and show how their
influence affects equilibrium capital allocation. The idea is that if the CEO can perfectly estimate
relative productivity, condition (9) is always satisfied. However, the CEO’s estimation is
partially determined by the managers’ influence. Therefore, at equilibrium, optimal capital
allocation is jointly determined by both the managers and the CEO.
𝐼∗ −𝐼�
𝚥,𝑡

𝜃

𝑗,𝑡
Proposition 2: If, at equilibrium, capital allocation is optimal, there must be 𝐼𝑗,𝑡
∗ −𝐼� = 𝜃 .
𝑖,𝑡

𝚤,𝑡

𝑖,𝑡

Proof: At equilibrium, the CEO will allocate capital according to (8). Substituting 𝜃�𝚤,𝑡 = 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 −
�
�
�
�
𝐼�
𝚤,𝑡 = 𝜃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐼𝚤,𝑡 and 𝜃𝚥,𝑡 = 𝑆𝑗,𝑡 − 𝐼𝚥,𝑡 = 𝜃𝑗,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑗,𝑡 − 𝐼𝚥,𝑡 into (8) gives:
𝜃𝑗,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑗,𝑡 − 𝐼�
𝑘′(𝐶𝑖,𝑡 )
𝚥,𝑡
=
�
𝑘′(𝐶𝑗,𝑡 )
𝜃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐼𝚤,𝑡

(10)

∗
∗
Define 𝐼𝑖,𝑡
and 𝐼𝑗,𝑡
as the levels of managers’ influence at optimal capital allocation. Combining

with (9), for capital allocation to be optimal at equilibrium, we must have:
∗
𝜃𝑗,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑗,𝑡
− 𝐼�
𝜃𝑗,𝑡
𝚥,𝑡
=
∗
𝜃𝑖,𝑡
𝜃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐼�
𝚤,𝑡

(11)

Simplifying (11) gives:
∗
𝐼𝑗,𝑡
− 𝐼�
𝜃𝑗,𝑡
𝚥,𝑡
=
∗
𝜃𝑖,𝑡
𝐼𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐼�
𝚤,𝑡

(12)

Up to this point, I have added the managers’ influence to the model, and derived the
sufficient and necessary condition for efficient capital allocation at equilibrium. In words, for
equilibrium capital allocation to be optimal, the ratio of the actual influence exerted by the two
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managers, in excess to the CEO’s estimations of their influence, must equal to the relative
productivity of the two divisions. Suppose, if manager j exercises more influence than the level
indicated by (12), division j will be allocated more capital at equilibrium than the optimal
amount. The excess influence exerted by both managers can be understood as the CEO’s
judgement errors of the managers’ influence activities. In a way, condition (12) reflects the same
theme as condition (9), that absolute estimation errors may not necessarily destroy efficiency. If
the estimation errors of influence activities are made in proportion to productivities, equilibrium
capital allocation is still optimal. Importantly, equation (12) also shows that equilibrium capital
allocation is jointly determined by the behaviors of both division managers and the CEO. With
none of the parameters in (12) being observable to all the internal agents, this condition can only
be satisfied with joint coordination among the managers and the CEO.
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2.2.3.1.3 Division Managers’ Optimum
Now I examine the division managers’ equilibrium behaviors, and its impact on the
outcome of equilibrium capital allocation. As before, I use manager i to illustrate.
Proposition 3: Without the spillover effect, at equilibrium, manager i's influence is given
by 𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚[𝜃𝐻 − 𝜃𝑖,𝑡 , 𝐼].

Proof: In period t, manager i's objective is to maximize her private benefits:

subject to the capital constraint:

𝑈𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜌𝜃𝑖,𝑡 𝑘�𝐶𝑖,𝑡 �

(13)

𝐶𝑖,𝑡 ≤ 𝐶𝑓,𝑡

(14)

The Lagrangian associated with this maximization is:
𝐿𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜌𝜃𝑖,𝑡 𝑘�𝐶𝑖,𝑡 � + 𝜆𝑖,𝑡 �𝐶𝑓,𝑡 − 𝐶𝑖,𝑡 �

(15)

The first order conditions of this Lagragian are:
𝜕𝐿𝑖,𝑡
= 𝜌𝜃𝑖,𝑡 𝑘 ′ �𝐶𝑖,𝑡 � − 𝜆𝑖,𝑡 = 0
𝜕𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝐿𝑖,𝑡
= 𝐶𝑓,𝑡 − 𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 0
𝜕𝜆𝑖,𝑡
𝜆𝑖,𝑡 ≥ 0

𝐶𝑖,𝑡 ≤ 𝐶𝑓,𝑡

∗∗
Define 𝐶𝑖,𝑡
as the optimal capital allocation for manager i. At the optimum:
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(16)

(17)

(18)
(19)

∗∗
𝐶𝑖,𝑡
= 𝐶𝑓,𝑡

(20)

Comparing the optimal capital allocation for manager i in (20) with the optimal capital allocation
for the CEO and the firm in (7), it should be recognized that the CEO and the firm’s optimum
concerns the relative productivity of the two divisions, whereas manager i's optimum is
independent of this factor. In other words, it is not in the interests of the managers to rank order
productivities of the divisions. This difference in the agents’ objectives, as I show later, can lead
to inefficient capital allocation within the ICM.
To see how the optimum in (20) affects the equilibrium behaviors of manager i, note that
it is ideal for manager i to get the entirety of the corporate capital for her own division.
Therefore, regardless of 𝜃𝑗,𝑡 , manager i will, to her best ability, maximize the signal reported to

the CEO regarding the productivity of division i, specifically,
𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = max[𝜃𝐻 , 𝜃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼]

(21)

Therefore, at equilibrium, manager i's influence in period t is given by:
𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = min�𝜃𝐻 − 𝜃𝑖,𝑡 , 𝐼�

(22)

Equation (22) describes the equilibrium behavior of manager i. In word, manager i will, if within
her ability, exert enough influence to signal to the CEO that her division’s productivity is the
highest productivity realizable. And if that is beyond her influence ability, she will exert the
maximum influence she can in the signal she sends to the CEO. Interestingly, (22) also implies
that the lower the actual productivity of division i is, the more influence manager i is likely to
exert. This is similar to the conclusion of Meyer et al. (1992) that influence cost is caused by the
divisions with the prospects of decline or layoffs. But the most important implication of (22) is
that, consistent with equation (20), at equilibrium, manager i's influence is independent of the
18

relative productivity of the two divisions. Moreover, behaviors of the other internal agents are
also irrelevant to manager i's equilibrium influence. Given that (22) also applies to manager j, the
𝜃

𝜃

left side of (12) can be anywhere within the interval [𝜃𝐿 , 𝜃𝐻 ], and thus the condition for optimal
𝐻

𝐿

capital allocation in (12) can only happen by random chance. To explain the inefficient capital

allocation presented at this point intuitively, it is to the best interest of the firm for the agents to
coordinate and base capital allocation decisions on relative productivity, but the managers
optimums in (20) and equilibrium behaviors in (22) does not provide the incentives for them to
be concerned about the other agents’ behaviors or the productivity ranking orders. Therefore, to
mitigate the inefficiency problem, an incentive is needed to align the interests of the managers
with the interests of the firm and the CEO.
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2.2.3.2 The Case with Spillover Effects
In this section, I introduce a spillover effect between divisions i and j, and show how this
effect helps align the interests of the agents, and thus facilitates optimal capital allocation at
equilibrium. With the presence of the spillover effect, the production of division j generates
incremental outputs for division i, in the amount of a fraction, 𝛼, of division j’s production
outputs, with 𝛼 𝜀 [0,1] and observable to all the agents. That is to say, in period t, the spillover gain

in division i's outputs, from division j’s production, is given by 𝛼𝜃𝑗,𝑡 𝑘(𝐶𝑗,𝑡 ). Essentially, this

spillover represents a positive externality, and to help understanding, I use the following example

to illustrate. Consider a steel company, with one division controlling the mills that make the
steel, and another division extracting iron from the mines. Suppose the mining division invests in
an advanced iron extraction technology that significantly reduces extraction costs and increases
outputs. As a result, the mining division is able to supply a greater quantity of iron to the mills at
a lower price, and thus increase the production outputs of the mills without necessarily
increasing its production costs. Note that, on one hand, the mills do not incur any investment
expenditure for the incremental outputs; on the other hand, the mining division does not need to
share the return of this investment in order to create the spillover gain for the mills. This second
point also distinguishes the spillover effect from the sharing of investment surplus modeled in
Rajan et al. (2000), in which the gain of one division comes at the expense of the loss of another
division.
This spillover effect essentially changes the production function of the firm. Specifically,
with both divisions generating outputs for themselves and for each other, the firm’s production
function becomes (1 + 𝛼)𝑘(𝐶𝑡 ). And the outputs of division i are now given by 𝜃𝑖,𝑡 𝑘�𝐶𝑖,𝑡 � +

𝛼𝜃𝑗,𝑡 𝑘(𝐶𝑗,𝑡 ). It is easily seen that the spillover effect does not alter the CEO and the firm’s
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optimization problem. Therefore, with the spillover effect, the CEO and the firm’s optimum is,
again, given by (7), with the sufficient and necessary condition given by (12). Propositions 1 and
2 still apply here. However, the optimums and equilibrium behaviors of the managers change
significantly once the spillover effect is introduced. Specifically, I have the following
proposition.
Proposition 4: With the spillover effects, at equilibrium, manager i's influence is given
by 𝐼_𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡 =

𝜃𝑖,𝑡 (𝜃𝑗,𝑡 +𝐼𝑗,𝑡 −𝐼�
𝚥,𝑡 )
𝛼𝜃𝑗,𝑡

− 𝜃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼�
𝚤,𝑡 .

Proof: With the spillover effect, in period t, manager i's objective is still to maximize her private
benefits:
𝑈_𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜌[𝜃𝑖,𝑡 𝑘�𝐶𝑖,𝑡 � + 𝛼𝜃𝑗,𝑡 𝑘�𝐶𝑗,𝑡 �]

(23)

𝐿_𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜌�𝜃𝑖,𝑡 𝑘�𝐶𝑖,𝑡 � + 𝛼𝜃𝑗,𝑡 𝑘�𝐶𝑗,𝑡 �� − 𝜆_𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡 �𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐶𝑗,𝑡 − 𝐶𝑓,𝑡 �

(24)

subject to the same capital constraint in (2). The Lagrangian associated with this maximization
is:

The first order conditions of this Lagragian are:
𝜕𝐿_𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡
= 𝜌𝜃𝑖,𝑡 𝑘 ′ �𝐶𝑖,𝑡 � − 𝜆_𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = 0
𝜕𝐶𝑖,𝑡

𝜕𝐿_𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡
= 𝜌𝛼𝛼𝑗,𝑡 𝑘 ′ �𝐶𝑗,𝑡 � − 𝜆_𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = 0
𝜕𝐶𝑗,𝑡
𝜕𝐿_𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡
= 𝐶𝑓,𝑡 − 𝐶𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐶𝑗,𝑡 = 0
𝜕𝜆_𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡

∗∗
∗∗
Define 𝐶_𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡
and 𝐶_𝑠𝑠𝑗,𝑡
as the optimal capital allocation for manager i. At the optimum:
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(25)

(26)

(27)

∗∗
𝜃𝑗,𝑡
𝑘′(𝐶_𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡
)
∗∗ = 𝛼
𝑘′(𝐶_𝑠𝑠𝑗,𝑡 )
𝜃𝑖,𝑡

(28)

First, comparing with the optimum in (20), manager i's optimum in (28) is no long
independent of the two divisions’ relative productivity. Essentially, the spillover effect makes the
productivity of division j relevant in manager i's optimum. And this relevance increases with 𝛼.
Comparing manager i's optimum in (28) with the CEO and firm’s optimum in (7), I observe that,
for 𝛼 𝜀 [0,1], as 𝛼 increases, manager i's optimum approaches the CEO and the firm’s optimum.

In other words, the higher the spillover effect is, the less the objectives of the agents differ. And
in the extreme case where the spillover effect is 100%, the optimum of manager i in (28)
converges to the optimum of the CEO and the firm given by (7).
Now I examine how the spillover effect facilitates efficient capital allocation through
changing the manager i's equilibrium influence level. Once again, the CEO’s capital allocation
decision is given by (8). In order to maximize her private benefits, at equilibrium, manager i will
exert influence, 𝐼_𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡 , so that

𝜃�
𝜃𝑗,𝑡
𝚥,𝑡
=𝛼
�
𝜃𝑖,𝑡
𝜃𝚤,𝑡

(29)

�
�
�
�
Substituting 𝜃�𝚤,𝑡 = 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐼�
𝚤,𝑡 = 𝜃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐼𝚤,𝑡 and 𝜃𝚥,𝑡 = 𝑆𝑗,𝑡 − 𝐼𝚥,𝑡 = 𝜃𝑗,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑗,𝑡 − 𝐼𝚥,𝑡 into (29)
gives:

𝐼_𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡 =

𝜃𝑖,𝑡 (𝜃𝑗,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑗,𝑡 − 𝐼�
𝚥,𝑡 )
− 𝜃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼�
𝚤,𝑡
𝛼𝜃𝑗,𝑡

(30)

Equation (30) describes the equilibrium behavior of manager i with the presence of the
spillover, and should be distinguished from the one given by (22) in that, now the productivities
of both divisions and actions of all internal agents come into play in manager i's decision
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making. Moreover, for given levels of productivities, manager j’s influence, and the CEO’s
estimations of the influence activities, the larger the spillover effect is, the less influence
manager i will exert at equilibrium. Most importantly, as 𝛼 → 1, 𝐼_𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡 in (30) approaches the

sufficient and necessary condition required for efficient capital allocation in (12). And when 𝛼 =

1, the influence levels of the two managers converge, both managers’ optimums converge with
the firm’s optimum, and equation (30) converges with the optimal allocation condition (12).
Essentially, the implication of Proposition 4 is that the spillover effect helps align the objectives

of different agents and the firm, and thus improves the efficiency of the ICM through changing
the agents’ equilibrium behaviors. The larger the spillover effect is, the closer the equilibrium
capital allocation is to the optimal capital allocation. Eventually, when the spillover effect is
100%, there is no longer any discrepancy between the objectives of the agents. In this case, the
inefficiencies of ICM are eliminated, and capital allocation within a multi-division firm
converges to the case of a stand-alone entity.
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2.2.4 Related Models

2.2.4.1 Efficient ICM: Stein (1997)
At this point, it is useful to relate the model to existing theories in the literature. In
support of the internal capital market, Stein (1997) models how the “winner picking” function of
the corporate headquarters provides a partial solution to the overinvestment problem that occurs
when all investments are financed as stand-alone projects. Since “winner picking” only requires
that the CEO’s judgement errors on the qualities of all investment projects are correlated, it
justifies the organizational design with a focused strategy, because higher degree of focus leads
to more correlated projection errors. And with the projection errors being highly correlated, the
CEO’s ranking orders of the investment opportunities are likely to be correct, regardless of the
magnitudes of the absolute projection errors.
Stein (1997) demonstrates how the projection error correlations in the focused strategy
mitigate the effects of any misjudgements on investment prospects. A natural question that
follows is: what mechanism in a focused strategy can create the correlations in the CEO’s
projection errors? Stein (1997) gives an example where all the divisions in the firm belong to the
same industry. This example is certainly appropriate because divisions in the same industry are
more likely to face similar investment opportunities and prospects. As a result, the CEO is also
more likely to mis-evaluate all investment opportunities to the same degree, and thus effectively
perform “winner picking”.
Besides diversifying within industry, there can be other ways to mitigate allocation
inefficiencies in a multi-division firm. Without contradicting Stein’s example, my model
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proposes another solution that applies to a broader scope of firms. Essentially, through the
spillover effect, the production of one division is partially linked to the production the other
division. As a result, the managers adjust their equilibrium influence levels in accordance to both
the relative productivity, and the influence exerted by their counterparts. And as the size of the
spillover increases, the managers are more likely to exert excess influence in proportion to the
two divisions’ productivities, leading to higher correlation in the CEO’s estimation errors. Of
course, in the extreme case of 100% spillover, all internal agents’ behaviors become transparent
at equilibrium, all division managers exert zero influence, and the CEO does not anticipate any
influence activities. What’s also important is that the spillover effect can exist even if the
divisions do not belong to the same industry. In that case, linkages between the productions of
different divisions can be created through internal transactions.
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2.2.4.2 Inefficient ICM: The Rent-seeking Models
The literature also offers theories in support of ICM inefficiencies. Among the theoretical
studies that explain the inefficient capital allocation by the ICM, my model is first closely related
to the two rent-seeking models in Meyer et al. (1992) and Scharfstein and Stein (2000), in the
sense that inefficient capital allocation starts with division managers’ manipulation of the capital
distribution process. Division managers’ rent-seeking activities can take various forms, such as
exaggerating investment prospects (Meyer et al., 1992), “resume polishing” and “scorched earth”
(Scharfstein and Stein, 2000). These types of rent-seeking generate private benefits for the
managers in different ways. In Meyer et al. (1992), managers exert influence effort to increase
their job security, whereas in Scharfstein and Stein (2000), rent-seeking helps increase the
managers’ bargaining power with the CEO, and thus increases their compensations. Regardless
of the type of rent-seeking that causes the inefficiencies, the spillover effect helps relate the
private benefits of each division manager to the wellbeing of other divisions, and thus align the
objectives of the managers with the objective of the firm as a whole.
Comparing to the influence cost model in Meyer et al. (1992), my model also factors an
additional layer of conflict of interest. Meyer et al. (1992) only focus on the conflict between the
division level and the corporate headquarters level, but does not model the competition between
the divisions. In contrast, in my model, in absence of any spillover, all three internal agents have
different objectives. Therefore, the effects of the spillover are demonstrated in a multiway
dynamic environment.
In the two-tiered rent-seeking agency model, Scharfstein and Stein (2000) argue that
allocation inefficiencies do not necessarily occur with the presence of rent-seeking activities, if
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the rent-seeking managers get compensated with cash. My model does not conflict with this
argument. Instead, the important message is that the spillover effect reduces the managers’ needs
of engaging in any form of rent-seeking. Consequently, the potential of any allocation
inefficiencies is reduced on the first layer of the agency problem. Scharfstein and Stein (2000)
also show that, to some extent, one manager’s rent-seeking may depend on the rent-seeking
strategy of the other manager, and the scenario in which inefficiencies are most likely to occur is
when a weak division is paired with a strong division. The implication of this conclusion is that
the more diverse the prospects of the divisions are, the more likely it is for the ICM to be
inefficient. In some respect, the spillover effect also addresses this problem of diverse investment
states. Intuitively, the spillover effect creates an interrelation between the production outcomes
of different divisions. Therefore, the larger the spillover effect is, the closer the divisions’
production outcomes will be, which reduces the diversity in production prospects.
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2.2.4.3 Inefficient ICM: The Power-grabbling Model
Rajan et al. (2000) offers another explanation of the investment distortion within the
ICM. Instead of focusing on the inefficiencies in the distribution of investment capital that
occurs ex ante, they examine the ex post sharing of investment surplus among the divisions.
Specifically, both divisions make investments with their initial endowments of capital, and the
investment surplus is redistributed between divisions through negotiation. In their setting, each
division faces an efficient project and a defensive project. The efficient project offers higher
return, but is more prone to poaching by the other division, whereas the defensive project yields
lower return, but better protection to the division itself. Rajan et al. (2000) show that as the
difference in the products of productivity and initial capital increases, the divisions become more
likely to choose the defensive project over the efficient one. This outcome is identified as the
“power grabbing” problem. In this section, I incorporate the ex post sharing of investment
surplus in my model, and show that the spillover effect also provides a solution to division
managers’ “power grabbing”.
∗
∗
and 𝐶𝑗,𝑡 = 𝐶𝑗,𝑡
.
For simplicity, assume initial capital allocation is optimal, thus 𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐶𝑖,𝑡

Following the setting in Rajan et al. (2000), suppose the defensive project lowers the
productivity by 𝑥 , so, for example, by making the defensive investment, division i's production

∗
outputs become �𝜃𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑥�𝑘(𝐶𝑖,𝑡
). If both divisions choose the efficient projects, production

outputs are split equally between them. If, suppose division i, chooses the efficient investment

and division j does not, j will have the opportunity to grab division i's surplus. Division i can
defend itself, but at a greater cost than if a defensive project had been chosen. Specifically, if
∗
division j poaches, the production outputs of division i are given by �𝜃𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑦�𝑘(𝐶𝑖,𝑡
), where 𝑦 >
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𝑥 . On the other hand, the surplus that division j grabs from division i is almost fully matched by
∗
the cost of poaching, therefore, its production outputs are given by �𝜃𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑥�𝑘�𝐶𝑗,𝑡
� + 𝑣, where 𝑣

is a very small number. To sum up, the payoffs division i under different investment scenarios
are shown in the following table.
Payoff of Division i- without spillover
Division j investment

Efficient
Division i investment
Defensive

Efficient

Defensive

1
∗
∗
[𝜃𝑖,𝑡 𝑘�𝐶𝑖,𝑡
� + 𝜃𝑗,𝑡 𝑘�𝐶𝑗,𝑡
�]
2

∗
�𝜃𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑦�𝑘(𝐶𝑖,𝑡
)

∗
�𝜃𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑥�𝑘�𝐶𝑖,𝑡
�+𝑣

∗
�𝜃𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑥�𝑘�𝐶𝑖,𝑡
�

Given the payoffs shown above, the conditions for manager i to choose the efficient
investment are that manager j is expected to do the same, and
1
∗
∗
∗
[𝜃 𝑘�𝐶𝑖,𝑡
� + 𝜃𝑗,𝑡 𝑘�𝐶𝑗,𝑡
�] ≥ �𝜃𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑥�𝑘�𝐶𝑖,𝑡
�
2 𝑖,𝑡
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Manager j also requires similar conditions in order to choose the efficient project, therefore, the
condition for both divisions to make the efficient investments is:
1
∗
∗
∗
∗
�𝜃𝑖,𝑡 𝑘�𝐶𝑖,𝑡
� + 𝜃𝑗,𝑡 𝑘�𝐶𝑗,𝑡
�� ≥ max��𝜃𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑥�𝑘�𝐶𝑖,𝑡
�, �𝜃𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑥�𝑘�𝐶𝑗,𝑡
��
2

(32)

∗
For simplicity, define 𝑧𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜃𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑥. And suppose, without loss of generality, that 𝑧𝑖,𝑡 𝑘�𝐶𝑖,𝑡
�>

∗
). Simplifying (32) gives:
𝑧𝑗,𝑡 𝑘(𝐶𝑗,𝑡

∗
∗
∗
∗
𝑥[𝑘�𝐶𝑖,𝑡
� + 𝑘�𝐶𝑗,𝑡
�] ≥ 𝑧𝑖,𝑡 𝑘�𝐶𝑖,𝑡
� − 𝑧𝑗,𝑡 𝑘�𝐶𝑗,𝑡
�
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(33)

For any period t, optimal capital allocation is fixed, resulting in a fixed level of the lefthand side of (33). Therefore, inequality (33) implies that, in order for the efficient investments to
be made in both divisions, the difference between the products of division productivity and
investment capital cannot be too large. Rajan et al. (2000) interpret this as the inefficiencies
caused by the diversity in resources and opportunities.
Now I incorporate the spillover effect in the analysis. With the presence of the spillover
effect, suppose if division j pursues the efficient project, it generates a spillover gain for division
i that equals a fraction, 𝛼, of division j’s outputs. At the same time, when the defensive project is

chosen, no spillover will be generated. Thus the payoffs of division i, when both “power
grabbing” and spillover are possible, are given in the following table.
Payoff of Division i- with spillover
Division j investment

Efficient
Division i investment
Defensive

Efficient

Defensive

1
∗
∗
(1 + 𝛼)[𝜃𝑖,𝑡 𝑘�𝐶𝑖,𝑡
� + 𝜃𝑗,𝑡 𝑘�𝐶𝑗,𝑡
�]
2

∗
�𝜃𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑦�𝑘(𝐶𝑖,𝑡
)

∗
∗
�𝜃𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑥�𝑘�𝐶𝑖,𝑡
� + 𝛼𝜃𝑗,𝑡 𝑘�𝐶𝑗,𝑡
�+𝑣

∗
�𝜃𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑥�𝑘�𝐶𝑖,𝑡
�

Now, the conditions for manager i to make the efficient investment are that manager j
makes the efficient investment, and
1
∗
∗
∗
∗
(1 + 𝛼)�𝜃𝑖,𝑡 𝑘�𝐶𝑖,𝑡
� + 𝜃𝑗,𝑡 𝑘�𝐶𝑗,𝑡
�� ≥ �𝜃𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑥�𝑘�𝐶𝑖,𝑡
� + 𝛼𝜃𝑗,𝑡 𝑘�𝐶𝑗,𝑡
�
2

Simplifying (34) gives:
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(34)

∗
∗
∗
(1 − 𝛼)[𝜃𝑖,𝑡 𝑘�𝐶𝑖,𝑡
� − 𝜃𝑗,𝑡 𝑘�𝐶𝑗,𝑡
�] ≤ 2𝑥𝑥�𝐶𝑖,𝑡
�

(35)

Similarly, the conditions that apply to manager j are manager i chooses the efficient investment,
and
∗
∗
∗
(1 − 𝛼)[𝜃𝑗,𝑡 𝑘�𝐶𝑗,𝑡
� − 𝜃𝑖,𝑡 𝑘�𝐶𝑖,𝑡
�] ≤ 2𝑥𝑥�𝐶𝑗,𝑡
�

(36)

In words, for both managers to make the efficient investments, conditions (35) and (36)
∗
∗
must be satisfied. Again, without losing generality, assume 𝜃𝑖,𝑡 𝑘�𝐶𝑖,𝑡
� > 𝜃𝑗,𝑡 𝑘�𝐶𝑗,𝑡
�, so condition

∗
∗
∗
� − 𝜃𝑗,𝑡 𝑘�𝐶𝑗,𝑡
�, 𝑥 and 𝑘�𝐶𝑖,𝑡
�, the
(36) is always satisfied. Given fixed levels of 𝜃𝑖,𝑡 𝑘�𝐶𝑖,𝑡

larger 𝛼 is, the more likely it is for condition (35) to be satisfied. Therefore, even with the

possibility of inter-divisional “power grabbing”, the spillover effect can improve the efficiency
of the internal capital market.
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2.2.5 Empirical Implications
My model shows that the spillover effect is the key to solving the ICM inefficiencies. In
practice, the size of the spillover largely depends on a firm’s diversification strategy. Galbraith
and Nathanson (1978) lay out three main diversification strategies that multiproduct firms use:
unrelated diversification, related diversification, and vertical integration. Hill and Hoskisson
(1987) summarize the economic benefits of each of these three strategies and propose
implementation strategies to achieve these economic benefits. Unrelated diversification is
generally associated with financial economies, including the co-insurance effect (Lewellen,
1971), cash flow reallocation, and the ability to overcome external market failures (Teece, 1982;
Williamson, 1975). While unrelated diversification creates financial linkages between the
divisions, by definition, there is no interdependence in the divisions’ operations.
Related diversification is established with multiple divisions belonging to the same
industry. This type of strategy is used to exploit synergistic economies (Hill and Hokisson
(1987)). Synergy is also referred to as “economies of scope” and generally arises from inputs that
are shared or jointly utilized by related business activities (Hill and Hokisson (1987), Teece
(1980, 1982), and Willig (1978)). Thus one way that related diversification can help improve
ICM efficiency is through inter-divisional sharing, in which case internal competition between
the divisions is not necessary. In another way, as the example in Stein (1997), it is easier for the
CEO to perform “winner picking” effectively when all the divisions belong to the same industry.
While both mechanisms help improve ICM efficiency, neither of them do so by creating interdivisional spillover.
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Essentially, the spillover effect is created when different divisions are operationally
linked. The vertical integration strategy creates such linkage. A unique feature of vertical
integration is that the divisions are integrated along the supply chain and inter-division
transactions are an integral part of the operations of the firm. Vertical integration is associated
with vertical economies. From a contracting point of view, vertical economies arise with the
elimination of transaction costs. From an operational point of view, vertical economies take the
form of integration economies, as well as control over raw materials or outlets (Pfer and
Salancik, 1978; Scherer, 1981). Hill and Hokisson (1987) argue that the realization of vertical
economies by vertical integration is due to the fact that the recipient (downstream) division is a
customer of the source (upstream) division. Interestingly, in the presence of this suppliercustomer linkage, the demands, or revenue streams, of divisions become positively related.
Therefore, an investment opportunity that increases the production outputs of one division is also
likely to bring new additional outputs to other divisions along the supply chain, as I illustrated
earlier in the example of the steel company. This is the spillover effect in the model. The idea
that the spillover effect exists between suppliers and customers is supported by Cohen and
Frazzini (2008), who use the supplier-customer economic links to predict future stock returns.
Thus, I use the level of vertical integration as a proxy for the spillover effect. It is important to
note that vertical integration is defined by the inter-divisional supplier-customer relation, and
does not necessarily exclude the case in which two divisions are linked along the supply chain,
and at the same time belong to the same industry.
To test the effect of vertical integration on ICM efficiency, I use two proxies for capital
allocation efficiency: cash flow sensitivity of investments and innovative efficiency. I use cash
flow sensitivity of investments similar to Shin and Stulz (1998). They argue that when internal
33

capital allocation is efficient, division-level investment should be less sensitive to the division’s
own cash flows when the division faces the best investment opportunity within a firm. This is
because an efficient ICM will direct limited investment capital to the most productive project. I
also measure ICM efficiency by innovative efficiency, as Seru (2014) argues that R&D activities
embody a high degree of information asymmetry between the division managers and the CEO. In
the presence of information asymmetry, the division researchers have the incentives to overstate
their investment prospects to the corporate headquarters. This is akin to the influence cost
identified by Meyer et al. (1992). Without an efficient ICM, the corporate headquarters may end
up distributing limited capital to mediocre projects or be reluctant to endeavor in R&D activities
in the first place. Therefore, R&D investments are expected to be less efficient within
organizations where the ICM is inefficient.
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2.3 DATA AND SAMPLE

2.3.1 Sample
The empirical tests are run using two samples: a base sample and an innovation sample. I
test ICM efficiency using the approach of Shin and Stulz (1998) on the base sample, and test
ICM efficiency using innovative efficiency on the innovation sample. As I will discuss later, I
first construct a firm-level vertical integration coefficient (VIC), using segment industry
information and the detailed Use Table of Benchmark Input-Output Accounts provided by the
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), from 1982 to 2007. To build both samples, I start with all
multi-segment firms listed on the Compustat industry segment files between 1980 and 2007. I
follow the procedure in Shin and Stulz (1998) to form the base sample. For each segment, I
collect the following information: sales, operating profit (loss), depreciation, capital
expenditures, identifiable total assets, and SIC code. Segment-years that do not contain complete
information are excluded. Further, I eliminate segment-years in which any of the following ratios
exceed one: current value of net capital expenditure (gross capital expenditure minus
depreciation) over the previous year’s segment assets, sales growth from the previous year’s
sales, cash flows to segment assets, and other segments’ cash flows to the total assets of those
segments. Cash flows are calculated as operating profit (loss) plus depreciation and amortization.
In addition, I delete cases in which the smallest segment has the same 2-digit SIC code as the
largest segment. Lastly I exclude financial firms (SIC codes 6000 to 6999). Then, I merge this
data set with VIC, which will be defined in detail in the next section. This procedure yields
17,583 firms-years and 46,760 segment-years in the base sample.
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To construct the innovation sample, I obtain innovation related data from the National
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). The NBER patent dataset covers patent grants
information from 1967 to 2006. Using this data, I construct a measure of innovative efficiency.
Then, I merge the firm-level financial data of all multi-segment firms listed on the Compustat
industry segment file with the R&D data and VIC. Further, I exclude financial firms (SIC code
6000 to 6999). This procedure generates 26,282 firm-year observations in the innovation sample.

36

2.3.2 Variable Construction

2.3.2.1 Vertical Integration Coefficient (VIC)
I measure the degree of vertical integration based on commodity flows between industries
in the U.S. economy. The BEA has published the Benchmark Input-Output tables (IO tables)
between all producers and purchasers in the economy since 1947. The IO tables are primarily
based on the Economic Census and are published every five years with a five-year delay. The
latest IO tables available are for year 2007 (the 2012 IO tables will be published in year 2017).
The BEA defines industries at the summary level and the detailed level. For each level, the IO
tables include a Make Table, Use Table, Direct Requirement Table, and Total Requirement
Table. My measure of vertical integration is built on the detailed Use Table for years 1982, 1987,
1992, 1997, 2002, and 2007. The numbers of industries reported in different years range from
411 to 478. The Use Table reports for each industry pair m and n, the dollar value of m’s output
required to produce n’s total output, at the producer’s price. Industries are defined by SIC code
before 1997 and by NAICS code since 1997. SIC codes reported range from 2-digit to 4-digit,
whereas NACIS codes reported range from 2-digit to 6-digit.
To construct VIC, I begin by dividing the segment data into six time periods, 1980-1982,
1983-1987, 1988-1992, 1993-1997, 1998-2002, and 2003-2007, and apply the Use Tables of
years 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2002, and 2007 to each time period respectively. Specifically,
within each firm, I pair each division with each of the other divisions in the same firm. For
example, a firm, A, with three divisions, x, y, and z, will have six division pairs, xy, xz, yx, yz, zx,
and zy. Then, I match the division pairs to the Use Table by the divisions’ industry codes. After
the match, I am able to obtain the dollar value of commodities transferred between each division37

pair’s industries. To illustrate, axy denotes the dollar value of output produced by division y’s
industry required to produce the total output of division x’s industry. I divide axy by the dollar
value of total output produced by division x’s industry to get vxy. vxy represents the dollar value of
output produced by division y’s industry that is required to produce one dollar’s worth of output
in division x’s industry. Similarly, I calculate vxz, vyx, vyz, vzx, and vzy. In the step, I take the
weighted average of vxy and vxz to obtain Vx. The weight used is the sales of division y and
division z. Vx represents the dollar value of output produced by the industries of all the other
divisions in firm A that is required to produce one dollar’s worth of output in division x’s
industry. Accordingly, I calculate Vy and Vz. I define the vertical integration coefficient of firm A
as the maximum of Vx, Vy and Vz, VICA = max {Vx, Vy ,Vz}. Ahern and Harford (2014), Fan and
Lang (2000), and Kumar (2013) have used a similar approach to measure vertical industry links.
As mentioned earlier, industry codes reported in the Use Tables are not standardized and can
range from 2-digit to 4-digit for SIC codes and 2-digit to 6-digit for NAICS codes. To obtain the
most accurate and comprehensive match between the segment file and the Use Tables, for each
division pair, I match with the divisions’ primary SIC or NAICS codes first, and if no matches
are found, I switch to the divisions’ secondary SIC or NAICS codes. Furthermore, I start the
match with the narrowest industry codes (4-digit SIC codes or 6-digit NAICS codes) and
gradually loosen the matching criteria to the broadest industry codes (2-digit SIC codes or 2-digit
NAICS codes).
By construction, VIC reflects the strongest supplier-customer relation that exists between
the divisions within the same firm. One would expect VIC to be between 0 and 1, as it is not
likely for a division to acquire more than one dollar’s worth of inputs from other divisions in
order to produce one dollar’s worth of outputs. However, in reality, a VIC greater than 1 may
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exist for several reasons. First, for a division with a high-level of inventory, not all outputs of its
production are realized in sales. Following the calculation procedure, the dollar value of inputs
acquired may be greater than the dollar value of sales for this division, resulting in a VIC greater
than 1. Second, to get vxy, I divide axy by the dollar value of total outputs produced by division
x’s industry, where total output of division x’s industry is calculated by summing up this
industry’s supply to all the other industries in the economy provided by the Use Table. But this
procedure can yield very low total outputs for industries that mostly produce consumer products
or services, which are directly supplied to end consumers, such as the retailing or health care
industries. As a result, for divisions that belong to such industries, the calculated VIC can be
greater than 1. Less than 1% of the VICs I calculated are greater than 1. Nevertheless, to avoid
extreme outliers, I set VIC to 3 for values greater than 3.
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2.3.2.2 Innovative Efficiency
Following Seru (2014), I use patent-based metrics to measure innovative efficiency.
Trajtenberg (1990) and Griliches (1990) both demonstrate that whereas R&D intensity focuses
on the expense incurred during the research and development process, patent-based metrics
provide a better measure of the efficiency of R&D activities. Specifically, for each firm-year, I
count the number of patents filed that were later granted. This simple measure of patent counts is
biased for two reasons. First, as Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2002) identify, a truncation bias
exists toward the end of the sample period, because it takes an average of two years from the
time when a patent is filed to the time when it is granted. Second, patent intensities vary across
industries. To address these concerns, I follow Hall et al. (2001) and, in each year, divide the
number of patents by the mean number of patents in the industry to which a firm belongs. I use
this adjusted number of patents for each firm-year, Patent, as the measure of innovative
efficiency. For firm-years for which no patent filed has been granted, Patent equals zero.
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2.3.2.3 Other Variables
In my tests, I also employ a set of other segment or firm level variables. I construct the
segment-level variables following Shin and Stulz (1998). The segment-level variables include:
Investmenti,j,t, calculated as the capital expenditure of division j of firm i in year t, divided by the
total assets of firm i in year t-1; Sales Growthi,j,t, calculated as the sales growth of division j of
firm i from year t-2 to year t-1; Cash Flowi,j,t, calculated as the sum of operating profit and
depreciation and amortization of division j of firm i in year t, divided by the total assets of firm i
in year t-1; and Tobin’s Qi,j,t, Tobin’s Q of division j of firm i in year t, calculated as the median
Q of single-division firms in segment j’s 2-digit SIC industry in year t, where Q is calculated as
the ratio of the book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of
equity to the book value of assets.
Firm-level variables include: LogATi,t, calculated as the natural log of firm i’s total assets
in year t; R&Di,t, calculated as R&D expenditure, divided by the total assets of firm i in year t (I
replace missing R&D expenditure with zero); Profitabilityi,t, calculated as the ratio of EBITDA to
total assets of firm i in year t; Leveragei,t, calculated as the sum of long-term debt and debt in
current liabilities, divided by the total assets of firm i in year t; Market-to-Booki,t, calculated as
the ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of equity of firm i in year t; Cashi,t,
calculated as cash, divided by the total assets of firm i in year t; and Capxi,t, calculated as capital
expenditure, divided by the total assets of firm i in year t. I also control for 2-digit SIC industry
level Herfindahl index, HHIi,t. All accounting ratios are winsorized at 1% and 99% to eliminate
extreme outliers.
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2.3.3 Summary Statistics
Table 2.1 reports the summary statistics of the two samples. Panel A presents the
summary statistics of both the firm-level and the segment-level variables for the base sample.
The mean and median of VICi,t are 0.1446 and 0.0189, respectively, with a standard deviation of
0.3942. LogATi,t has a mean of 5.7280, a median of 5.8014 and a standard deviation of 2.4450.
For the segment level variables, the mean (median) of Investmenti,j,t is 0.0228 (0.0107), and the
standard deviation is 0.0329; Sales Growthi j,t has a mean of 0.0708, a median of 0.0626, and a
standard deviation of 0.2417; the mean, median, and standard deviation of Cash Flowi,j,t are
0.0496, 0.0317, and 0.0631, respectively; Tobin’s Qi,j,t has a mean of 1.5018, a median of 1.3692,
and a standard deviation of 0.4919.
Panel B reports the summary statistics for the innovation sample. VICi,t has a mean of
0.1401, a median of 0.0227, and a standard deviation of 0.3620. The mean and median of R&Di,t
are 0.0205 and 0.0000, respectively, with the standard deviation being 0.0455. The mean,
median, and standard deviation of Patenti,t are 0.4179, 0.0000, and 1.1654. LogATi,t has a mean
of 6.1244, a median of 6.2176, and a standard deviation of 2.3911. The mean of Profitabilityi,t is
0.1058, with the median and standard deviation being 0.1203 and 0.1296, respectively.
Leveragei,t has a mean of 0.2709, a median of 0.2628, and a standard deviation of 0.1714. The
mean, median and standard deviation of Market-to-Booki,t are 2.5714, 1.6356, and 3.8108. The
mean of Cashi,t is 0.0652, and its median and standard deviation are 0.0284 and 0.0970,
respectively. Capxi,t has a mean of 0.0668, a median of 0.0525, and a standard deviation of
0.0584. Lastly, the mean, median, and standard deviation of HHIi,t are 0.0768, 0.0528 and
0.0811, respectively.
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2.3.4 Correlations
Table 2.2 presents the Pearson correlations among the key variables. In Panel A, I report
the correlations for the base sample. At first glance, VICi,t is negatively related to segment-level
Investmenti,j,t, Cash Flowi,j,t, and Tobin’s Qi,j,t. It is positively related to segment sales growth.
What is also evident is that segment-level investments are strongly positively correlated with the
segment’s own cash flows and sales growth, although the magnitude of the correlation between
Investmenti,j,t and Sales Growthi,j,t is only 0.1413. As I will discuss in later section, I use the base
sample to test the role of vertical integration in ICM capital allocation by examining how VIC
moderates the dependence of segment-level investments on the segment’s own cash flows, when
the segment faces the best investment opportunity in the firm. This moderation effect cannot be
observed in the univariate correlations.
Panel B reports the correlations for the innovation sample. It appears that VIC is
positively related to firm size. Furthermore, higher VIC leads to lower R&D investments, but a
higher number of patents produced. This seems to suggest that when the level of vertical
integration increases, R&D activities become more productive, indicating higher capital
allocation efficiency by the ICM in more vertically integrated organizations. In the following
sections, I perform additional tests to examine whether this relation is robust.
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2.3.5 Univariate Analysis
I divide both the base sample and the innovation sample into quartiles by the level of VIC
and conduct univariate t-tests on the main variables. Table 2.3 reports the results. As mentioned
in the previous section, I use the base sample to test the moderation effect of VIC on the
dependence of segment-level investments on the segment’s own cash flows, when the segment
faces the best investment opportunity in the firm, and because this effect can only be observed in
a multivariate setting, I will only focus the univariate results of the innovation sample in this
section of the paper. 1 The results are presented in Panel B. When comparing the lowest VIC
quartile with the highest VIC quartile, I observe that firms located in the highest VIC quartile do
not have significantly different R&D intensity, but they produce a significantly larger number of
patents each year. This evidence is consistent with what I observed in the correlations and
suggests that more vertically integrated firms conduct more efficient R&D. In other words, the
limited R&D capital is allocated to the more promising projects among all the divisions under
higher degree of vertical integration, and thus yields higher return. Hence, the results seem to
suggest that, as my model predicts, vertical integration increases ICM capital allocation
efficiency.

1

I report the univariate comparison of the base sample in Panel A for completeness sake only.
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2.4 VIC AND INVESTMENT-CASH FLOW SENSITIVITY
To further examine the effect of vertical integration on internal resource allocation
efficiency, I first employ an approach similar to the one used in Shin and Stulz (1998). Their
paper investigates how capital investments at the segment level relate to the investment prospects
of the segments. The rationale is that efficient internal capital allocation implies a lower
investment-cash flow sensitivity for the segment with the best investment opportunity in a firm,
because an efficient ICM should allow that segment to take advantage of a good investment
opportunity, regardless of the amount of its own cash flows. However, one can only expect to
observe this effect for the smallest segment in a firm, because, by definition, the largest segment
is usually the segment that generates the most cash flows within the firm, thus its investments
naturally depend primarily on the segment’s own cash flows, without regard to its investment
prospect. A positive change in the segment’s investment outlook may not significantly change its
reliance on its own cash flows. On the other hand, the smallest segment, due to its low priority in
the firm, usually funds its own investment. However, when a good investment opportunity
emerges, the smallest segment’s own cash flows may not be sufficient to cover the investment
outlay. Under these circumstances, if the internal capital market is efficient, capital will be
directed from other segments to the smallest segment. Therefore, I should observe a significant
decrease in the reliance of the smallest segment’s investments on its own cash flows when a
good opportunity arises.
I incorporate the level of vertical integration using this line of logic. Specifically, I run
the following regression model:
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Investmenti, j, t = β1 Sales Growthi, j, t + β2Cash Flowi, j, t + β3Cash Flowi, other, t + β4Tobin’s Qi, j, t +
β5High Qi, j, t * Cash Flowi, j, t + β6High Qi, j, t * Cash Flowi, other, t + β7Tobin’s Qi, other, t +
β8Segment Fixed Effects + β9Industry Fixed Effects + β10Year Dummies + ε i, j, t

(37)

Where Cash Flowi, other, t is calculated as the sum of cash flows of all segments in firm i, except
for the cash flows of segment j, in year t, divided by the total assets of firm i, in year t-1; High
Qi,j,t is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if segment j has the highest Tobin’s Q among
all the segments within firm i in year t, zero otherwise; Tobin’s Qi,other,t is the highest Tobin’s Q
among all the segments within firm i, except for segment j, in year t; and other variables are
calculated as described in section 2.3.2.
I run model (37) for the smallest and the largest segments that are located in the lowest
and highest VIC quartiles. The expectation is that β2 is positive and significant, as the
investments of a segment depend, among other things, on its own cash flows. However, if an
active internal capital market exists, I should expect β5 to be negative and significant for the
smallest segment, because as argued above, the ICM should lower the investment-cash flow
sensitivity of the smallest segment, when that segment faces a good investment opportunity,
relative to other investment projects within the firm. Furthermore, if vertical integration increases
ICM efficiency, I should expect the magnitude of β5 to be greater in the highest VIC quartile
compared to the lowest VIC quartile. Also, as argued above, the effects of ICM may not be
profound in the largest segment, so I do not have an expectation for the two subsamples of the
largest segments.
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The results are presented in Table 2.4. As expected, β2 is positive and significant across
all four subsamples, indicating that segments’ own cash flows play an important role in
determining segment level investments. Consistent with my theoretical prediction, I observe β5 to
be negative and significant for the two smallest segment subsamples. For the smallest segments
located in the lowest VIC quartile, a 1% increase in segment Cash Flow leads to a 0.1031%
increase in Investment. However, if the smallest segment has the highest Tobin’s Q within the
firm, the investment-cash flow sensitivity decreases by 0.0262%. This implies about a 25%
decrease in investment-cash flow sensitivity. When I look at the results for the smallest segments
located in the highest VIC quartile, the effects of the ICM appear to be much greater. First, a 1%
increase in Cash Flow leads to approximately 0.0993% increase in Investment. However, if the
smallest segment has the highest Tobin’s Q within the firm, the investment-cash flow sensitivity
decreases by 0.0436%, which is about a 44% decrease, compared to the 25% decrease for the
smallest segments in the lowest VIC quartile. These findings suggest that while there is an active
internal capital market, the ICM is more efficient in more vertically integrated firms.
To show further evidence of the effects of VIC on ICM efficiency, I add VIC and a threeway interaction term between VIC, High Q, and Cash Flow to model (37). To be specific, I run
the following model separately for the smallest and largest segments:

Investmenti, j, t =γ1 Sales Growthi, j, t + γ2Cash Flowi, j, t + γ3Cash Flowi, other, t + γ4Tobin’s Qi, j, t +
γ5VICi, t + γ6High Qi, j, t * Cash Flowi, j, t + γ7VICi, t * High Qi, j, t * Cash Flowi, j, t + γ8High Qi, j, t *
Cash Flowi, other, t + γ9VICi, t * High Qi, j, t * Cash Flowi, other, t + γ10Tobin’s Qi, other, t + γ11Segment
Fixed Effects + γ12Industry Fixed Effects + γ13Year Dummies + ε i, j, t
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(38)

I expect vertical integration to further lower cash flow sensitivity of the investments in the
smallest segment of a firm, when that segment faces the best investment opportunity, and thus γ7
to be negative and significant for the smallest segment subsample.
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 2.5. Consistent with the expectation, γ7
is negative and significant at 5% level. I interpret the economic importance of this coefficient as
follows: while the best investment opportunity within the firm reduces the cash flow sensitivity
of the smallest segment’s investments, a 1% increase in VIC enhances the effect of a good
investment opportunity by further reducing its cash flow sensitivity by 0.0353%. Moving from
the first to the third VIC quartile of the base sample produces about an 8.34% increase in VIC
and this increase brings approximately 0.29% decrease in investment-cash flow sensitivity, for
given levels of Cash Flow and High Q. Economically, when holding VIC and Cash Flow
constant, having the best investment opportunity within the firm lowers the investment-cash flow
sensitivity of the smallest segment by 0.88%. And this decrease is further magnified by about
33% for firms located in the third VIC quartile, comparing to firms in the first VIC quartile.
Because the role of an efficient ICM is to reduce cash flow sensitivity of investments, especially
for small segments, this finding suggests, again, that capital allocation is more efficient within
more vertically integrated firms. Overall, the evidence presented in Tables 2.4 and 2.5 supports
my model’s main prediction that vertical integration improves ICM efficiency.
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2.5 VIC AND INNOVATIVE EFFICIENCY
In this section, I present further evidence on the link between vertical integration and
ICM efficiency by examining the efficiency of R&D investments. As Seru (2014) suggests,
R&D activities are characterized by a high degree of information asymmetry between the
divisions and the corporate headquarters, which hinders the efficiency of internal capital
allocation. Therefore, higher innovative efficiency is an indication of a more efficient internal
capital market. I incorporate vertical integration to this rationale. Specifically, I test the following
models:

R&Di,t = η1VICi, t + η2LogATi, t + η3Profitabilityi, t + η4Market-to-Booki, t + η5Cashi, t + η6Capxi, t +
η7HHIi, t + η8HHI2i, t + η9Industry Fixed Effects + η10Year Dummies + ε i, t

(39)

Patenti,t = λ1VICi, t + λ 2LogATi, t + λ 3Profitabilityi, t + λ 4Market-to-Booki, t + λ 5Cashi, t + λ 6Capxi, t
+ λ 7HHIi, t + λ 8HHI2i, t + λ9R&Di, t + λ10Industry Fixed Effects + λ11Year Dummies + ε i, t

(40)

The results of regressions (39) and (40) are presented in Table 2.6. First, I note that VIC
is negatively related to R&D, indicating that as the level of vertical integration increases, R&D
intensity decreases, although the economic significance in the decrease in R&D seems trivial.
However, when holding R&D constant, I find that VIC is positively related to Patent.
Specifically, for a given level of R&D intensity, a 1% increase in VIC leads to 0.0462% more
adjusted patents produced. In other words, R&D investments are more efficient when firms are
more vertically integrated. This suggests that under higher degree of vertical integration, R&D
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capital is allocated to the more productive projects, indicating a more efficient internal capital
market.
To more directly examine how much vertical integration increases innovative efficiency,
I add an interaction term between VIC and R&D. I run the following model:

Patenti,t = ζ1VICi, t + ζ2R&Di, t + ζ3VICi, t * R&Di, t + ζ4LogATi, t + ζ5Profitabilityi, t + ζ6Market-toBooki, t + ζ7Cashi, t + ζ8Capxi, t + ζ9HHIi, t + ζ10HHI2i, t + ζ11Industry Fixed Effects + ζ12Year
Dummies + ε i, t

(41)

I expect ζ2 and ζ3 to be positive and significant. A positive ζ2 indicates that higher R&D
intensity leads to more patents produced and a positive ζ3 indicates that vertical integration
enhances the positive effects of R&D intensity on the number of patents. The results are
presented in Table 2.7. Consistent with the expectation, I observe that 1% increase in R&D leads
to 1.9606% more adjusted patents produced. More importantly, as the level of VIC increases by
1%, the positive effects of R&D on Patent increases further by 2.5157%. Therefore, holding
R&D intensity constant, moving from the first to the third VIC quartile in the innovation sample
leads to 0.24 more patents produced. This is equivalent to an approximately 12% increase in
innovative efficiency. It appears that R&D investments are more efficient as the level of vertical
integration increases, implying the limited R&D capital is distributed to the more promising
opportunity, yielding better innovation outcome. Overall, the evidence presented in Tables 2.6
and 2.7 provides additional evidence that, as the level of vertical integration increases, the
internal capital market becomes more efficient.
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2.6 ROBUSTNESS
My measure of vertical integration, VIC, reflects the strongest inter-divisional vertical
link within a firm and minimizes the noise caused by inter-divisional links that are non-vertical.
However, this implies that this measure should best describe the level of vertical integration for
firms with relatively few divisions, because for firms with a large amount of divisions, this
measure may not capture all inter-divisional links (i.e., the non-vertical links). I find that 50% of
the sample consists of firms with three or fewer divisions. Therefore, although I do not tabulate
the results, I repeat my analyses using firms with three divisions, or fewer. As expected, I find
results similar to those reported earlier in the paper. For the investment-cash flow sensitivity test,
while having the best investment opportunity within the firm reduces the cash flow sensitivity of
the smallest segment’s investment, I find that a 1% increase in VIC enhances the effects of a
good investment opportunity by further reducing its flow sensitivity by 0.0344%. Economically,
this means that moving from the first to the third VIC quartile of the sample, which results in a
6.08% increase in VIC, leads to an approximately 0.21% decrease in investment-cash flow
sensitivity, for given levels of Cash Flow and High Q. This implies that, when holding VIC and
Cash Flow constant, having the best investment opportunity within the firm lowers the cash flow
sensitivity of the smallest segment by 1.36%. And, this decrease is further magnified by about
15% for firms located in the third VIC quartile, compared to firms in the first VIC quartile. These
results are significant at 10% level. For the innovative efficiency test, I find that a 1% increase in
R&D leads to 0.82% more adjusted patents (Patents) produced. In addition, as the level of VIC
increases by 1%, the positive effects of R&D on Patent increase further by 2.7454% more patent
produced. The results remain significant at 1% level. Overall, the results found for the subsample
of firms with three or fewer divisions are similar to those reported earlier in the paper.
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I also conduct my analyses using a weighted average VIC, wVIC, which is calculated as
the weighted average of bilateral vertical links between all divisions in the firm, using division
sales as the weights. In untabulated tests, I obtain slightly weaker, but qualitatively similar
results. For the investment-cash flow sensitivity test, while having the best investment
opportunity within the firm reduces the cash flow sensitivity of the smallest segment’s
investment, I also find when wVIC increases by 1%, the effects of a good investment opportunity
are enhanced by an additional 0.0334% reduction in investment-cash flow sensitivity.
Economically, moving from the first to the third wVIC quartile of the sample increases wVIC by
4.20%, which leads to an approximately 0.14% decrease in investment-cash flow sensitivity, for
given levels of Cash Flow and High Q. Therefore, while holding wVIC and Cash Flow constant,
having the best investment opportunity within the firm lowers the cash flow sensitivity of the
smallest segment’s investments by 1.18%, and this decrease is further magnified by about 12%
for firms located in the third wVIC quartile, compared to firms in the first wVIC quartile. These
results are significant at 10%. For the innovative efficiency test, I find that a 1% increase in
R&D leads to 0.87% more adjusted patents (Patents) produced. In addition, for a given R&D
level, when the level of wVIC increases by 1%, the positive effects of R&D on Patent increase
further by 1.7659% more patents produced. These results are significant at 5%. Overall, using
wVIC as the measure of vertical integration yields similar results that support the prediction of
my model.
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2.7 CONCLUSION
The purpose of an internal capital market is to overcome the overinvestment problem that
occurs when all available investment opportunities are funded as stand-alone projects. And this
function is performed through the “winner picking” of the corporate headquarters. However,
with the presence of information asymmetry between the divisions and the corporate
headquarters, the outcome of “winner picking” can be substantially influenced by the division
managers various influence efforts. This can lead to inefficient capital allocation when the
objectives of the managers and the objective of the CEO and the firm differ. The literature has
documented a large amount of evidence of the capital allocation inefficiencies. However, a
solution to this problem has not been proposed.
If the misalignment of interests between the agents and the firm is the cause of the ICM
inefficiencies, to mitigate this problem, we must start from aligning the objectives of the agents
with the objective of the firm. I show in my model that the inter-divisional spillover effect can
perform such a function. By allowing the production of one division to benefit from other
divisions’ investments, the spillover effect creates a positive interdependence in the divisions’
wellbeing. As the spillover effect becomes larger, this interdependence increases, and the
objectives of the division managers approach the objective of the CEO and the firm. Empirically,
I measure the size of the spillover effect by the degree of vertical integration. I provide evidence
that higher level of vertical integration is associated with more efficient internal capital markets.
While existing theories have identified various mechanisms that can cause the ICM
inefficiencies, such as influence cost, rent-seeking and power-grabbing, in some respect, all these
mechanisms originate from the same fact the firm and its agents have different objectives. And it
is important to note that by aligning the interests of different parties, my model addresses the
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various causes identified by the inefficient ICM theories in general. Therefore, the model can be
applied as a general solution to mitigate the capital misallocation problem faced by diversified
firms.
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Figure 2.1. Timing Capital Allocation Process

Manager i observe productivity 𝜃𝑖,𝑡 ,
decides the level of influence 𝐼𝑖,𝑡 , and
sends the CEO signal 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 .
CEO receives signal 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 , forms estimations
�
of influence 𝐼�
𝚤,𝑡 and productivity𝜃𝚤,𝑡 , and
allocate capital 𝐶𝑖,𝑡 to division i.
Production occurs, 𝜃𝑖,𝑡 realized,
�
𝐼𝚤,𝑡 observed.

CEO adjusts estimation of influence in
period 𝑡 + 1, 𝐼�
𝚤,𝑡+1 .
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Table 2.1 Summary Statistics
This table reports the summary statistics of the key variables for the base sample and the innovation sample. VICi,t is
calculated using the BEA Benchmark Use Tables of the years 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2002 and 2007; VICi,t greater
than 3 is set 3 to avoid extreme outliers; LogATi,t, is calculated as the natural log of firm i’s total assets in year t;
Investmenti,j,t, is calculated as the capital expenditure of division j of firm i in year t divided by the total assets of
firm i in year t-1; Sales Growthi,j,t is calculate as the sales growth of division j of firm i from year t-2 to year t-1;
Cash Flowi,j,t, is calculated as the sum of operating profit and depreciation and amortization of division j of firm i in
year t divided by the total assets of firm i in year t-1; Tobin’s Qi,j,t, Tobin’s Q of division j of firm i in year t, is
calculated as the median Q of single-division firms in segment j’s 2-digit SIC industry in year t, where Q is
calculated as the ratio of the book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity to
the book value of assets; Patenti, t is calculated as the number of patents filed by firm i in year t that were later
granted, divided by the mean number of patents in the industry to which firm i belongs in year t; R&Di,t, is
calculated as R&D expenditure divided by the total assets of firm i in year t (I replace missing R&D expenditure
with zero); Profitabilityi,t is calculated as the ratio EBITDA to total assets of firm i in year t; Leveragei,t is calculated
as the sum of long-term debt and debt in current liability divided by the total assets of firm i in year t; Market-toBooki,t is calculated as the ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of equity of firm i in year t; Cashi,t is
calculated as cash divided by the total assets of firm i in year t; Capxi,t is calculated as capital expenditure divided by
the total assets of firm i in year t; and HHIi,t is the 2-digit SIC industry level Herfindahl index of firm i in year t.

Variables
Firm Level Variables
VICi,t
LogAti,t
Segment Level Variables
Investmenti, j, t
Sales Growthi, j, t
Cash Flowi, j, t
Tobin's Qi, j, t
Variables
VICi, t
R&Di, t
Patenti, t
LogATi, t
Profitabilityi, t
Leveragei, t
Market-to-Booki, t
Cashi, t
Capxi, t
HHIi, t

N

Panel A: Base Sample
Mean Median

25%

75%

Standard Deviation

17,583
17,583

0.1446
5.7280

0.0189
5.8014

0.0022
4.0250

0.0856
7.5580

0.3942
2.4450

46,760
46,760
46,760
46,760

0.0228
0.0708
0.0496
1.5018

0.0107
0.0626
0.0317
1.3692

0.0036
-0.0432
0.0097
1.1678

0.0273
0.1792
0.0748
1.6983

0.0329
0.2417
0.0631
0.4919

Panel B: Innovation Sample
N
Mean Median
26,282
0.1401 0.0227
26,282
0.0205 0.0000
26,282
0.4179 0.0000
26,282
6.1244 6.2176
26,164
0.1058 0.1203
26,244
0.2709 0.2628
24,299
2.5714 1.6356
23,211
0.0652 0.0284
25,836
0.0668 0.0525
26,282
0.0768 0.0528

25%
0.0033
0.0000
0.0000
4.3490
0.1668
0.1426
1.0660
0.0109
0.0299
0.0777

75%
0.0998
0.0222
0.0990
7.9470
0.0729
0.3797
2.6410
0.0764
0.0849
0.0349

Standard Deviation
0.3620
0.0455
1.1654
2.3911
0.1296
0.1714
3.8108
0.0970
0.0584
0.0811
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Table 2.2 Pearson Correlation Matrix
This table reports the Pearson correlations between the key variables for the base sample (Panel A) and the
innovation sample (Panel B). VICi,t is calculated using the BEA Benchmark Use Tables of the years 1982, 1987,
1992, 1997, 2002 and 2007; VICi,t greater than 3 is set 3 to avoid extreme outliers; LogATi,t, is calculated as the
natural log of firm i’s total assets in year t; Investmenti,j,t, is calculated as the capital expenditure of division j of firm
i in year t divided by the total assets of firm i in year t-1; Sales Growthi,j,t is calculate as the sales growth of division j
of firm i from year t-2 to year t-1; Cash Flowi,j,t, is calculated as the sum of operating profit and depreciation and
amortization of division j of firm i in year t divided by the total assets of firm i in year t-1; Tobin’s Qi,j,t, Tobin’s Q
of division j of firm i in year t, is calculated as the median Q of single-division firms in segment j’s 2-digit SIC
industry in year t, where Q is calculated as the ratio of the book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus
the market value of equity to the book value of assets; Patenti, t is calculated as the number of patents filed by firm i
in year t that were later granted, divided by the mean number of patents in the industry to which firm i belongs in
year t; R&Di,t, is calculated as R&D expenditure divided by the total assets of firm i in year t (I replace missing
R&D expenditure with zero); Profitabilityi,t is calculated as the ratio EBITDA to total assets of firm i in year t;
Leveragei,t is calculated as the sum of long-term debt and debt in current liability divided by the total assets of firm i
in year t; Market-to-Booki,t is calculated as the ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of equity of firm
i in year t; Cashi,t is calculated as cash divided by the total assets of firm i in year t; Capxi,t is calculated as capital
expenditure divided by the total assets of firm i in year t; and HHIi,t is the 2-digit SIC industry level Herfindahl
index of firm i in year t. ***, **, and * denote significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.

Variables
VICi,t
Investmenti, j, t
Sales Growthi, j, t
Cash Flowi, j, t
Tobin's Qi, j, t

VICi, t
1
-0.0224***
0.0149***
-0.0230***
-0.0501***

Panel A: Base Sample
Investmenti, j, t
Sales Growthi, j, t

Cash Flowi, j, t

Tobin's Qi, j, t

1
0.1413***
0.5315***
-0.0135***

1
0.0211***

1

1
0.1672***
0.0239***
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Table 2.2 (Continued) Pearson Correlation Matrix

R&Di,t

Patent Counti,t

Panel B: Innovation Sample
LogATi,t
Profitabilityi,t Leveragei,t

Market-to-Booki,t

Cashi,t

Capxi,t

Variables

VICi,t

VICi, t

1

R&D, t

-0.0532***

1

Patenti, t

0.0540***

0.0461***

1

LogATi, t

0.1229***

-0.2185***

0.3401***

1

Profitabilityi, t

0.0420***

-0.4694***

0.0847***

0.3847***

1

Leveragei, t

0.0434***

-0.2423***

-0.0112***

0.2318***

0.0998***

1

Market-to-Booki, t

-0.0345***

0.2710***

-0.0137***

-0.1994***

-0.3285***

0.0037

1

Cashi, t

-0.0519***

0.3277***

-0.0486***

-0.2773***

-0.3350***

-0.3622***

0.1991***

1

Capxi, t

-0.0166***

-0.0710***

-0.0131***

0.0088***

0.0714***

0.0707***

0.0350***

-0.1049***

1

HHIi, t

-0.0027

-0.1079***

-0.0601***

-0.1428***

-0.0096***

-0.0070**

-0.0198***

-0.0216***

-0.0035
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HHIi,t

1

Table 2.3 Univariate Analysis
This table reports the T-tests of the difference in the key variables between the highest VIC quartile and the lowest
VIC quartile for the base sample (Panel A) and the innovation sample (Panel B). VICi,t is calculated using the BEA
Benchmark Use Tables of the years 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2002 and 2007; VICi,t greater than 3 is set 3 to avoid
extreme outliers; LogATi,t, is calculated as the natural log of firm i’s total assets in year t; Investmenti,j,t, is calculated
as the capital expenditure of division j of firm i in year t divided by the total assets of firm i in year t-1; Sales
Growthi,j,t is calculate as the sales growth of division j of firm i from year t-2 to year t-1; Cash Flowi,j,t, is calculated
as the sum of operating profit and depreciation and amortization of division j of firm i in year t divided by the total
assets of firm i in year t-1; Tobin’s Qi,j,t, Tobin’s Q of division j of firm i in year t, is calculated as the median Q of
single-division firms in segment j’s 2-digit SIC industry in year t, where Q is calculated as the ratio of the book
value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity to the book value of assets; Patenti, t
is calculated as the number of patents filed by firm i in year t that were later granted, divided by the mean number of
patents in the industry to which firm i belongs in year t; R&Di,t, is calculated as R&D expenditure divided by the
total assets of firm i in year t (I replace missing R&D expenditure with zero); Profitabilityi,t is calculated as the ratio
EBITDA to total assets of firm i in year t; Leveragei,t is calculated as the sum of long-term debt and debt in current
liability divided by the total assets of firm i in year t; Market-to-Booki,t is calculated as the ratio of the market value
of equity to the book value of equity of firm i in year t; Cashi,t is calculated as cash divided by the total assets of firm
i in year t; Capxi,t is calculated as capital expenditure divided by the total assets of firm i in year t; and HHIi,t is the
2-digit SIC industry level Herfindahl index of firm i in year t. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and *
denote significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.

Variables
Firm Level Variables
VICi,t
LogATi,t
Segment Level Variables
Investmenti, j, t
Sales Growthi, j, t
Cash Flowi, j, t
Tobin’s Qi, j, t

VIC Q1

Panel A: Base Sample
VIC Q2 VIC Q3 VIC Q4

0.0016
5.4215

0.0146
6.0042

0.0260
0.0660
0.0592
1.5023

Variables
VICi, t
R&Di,t
Patenti, t
LogAT
Profitabilityi, t
Leveragei, t
Market-to-Booki, t
Cashi, t
Capxi, t
HHIi, t

VIC Q1
0.0016
0.0193
0.3418
5.6195
0.0998
0.2739
2.6035
0.0662
0.0640
0.0751

0.0225
0.0215
0.0212
0.0740
0.0680
0.0752
0.0485
0.0449
0.0459
1.5014
1.4925
1.5108
Panel B: Innovation Sample
VIC Q2 VIC Q3 VIC Q4
0.0137
0.0588
0.4856
0.0207
0.0219
0.0203
0.4144
0.4894
0.4253
6.0582
6.3580
6.4581
0.1055
0.1081
0.1097
0.2663
0.2732
0.2702
2.6066
2.4773
2.5992
0.0678
0.0623
0.0645
0.0655
0.0686
0.0691
0.0791
0.0784
0.0746

0.0608
6.1170
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0.5479
6.3818

Difference (Q4-Q1)

T-Statistics

0.5464***
0.9602***

(51.50)
(19.06)

-0.0047***
0.0092***
-0.0133***
0.0085

(-10.93)
(2.90)
(-15.51)
(1.31)

Difference (Q4-Q1)
0.4840***
0.0010
0.0835***
0.8386***
0.0099***
-0.0037
-0.0043
-0.0017
0.0051***
-0.0005

T-Statistics
(65.33)
(1.24)
(4.30)
(20.05)
(4.20)
(-1.22)
(-0.06)
(0.94)
(5.06)
(-0.37)

Table 2.4 VIC and ICM Efficiency: Cash Flow-Investment Sensitivity I
This table reports the regression results of model (37) for the smallest and largest segments in the base sample. The
dependent variable is Investmenti,j,t, calculated as the capital expenditure of division j of firm i in year t divided by
the total assets of firm i in year t-1. VICi, t is calculated using the BEA Benchmark Use Tables of the years 1982,
1987, 1992, 1997, 2002 and 2007; VICi,t greater than 3 is set 3 to avoid extreme outliers. The independent variables
include: Sales Growthi,j,t, calculate as the sales growth of division j of firm i from year t-2 to year t-1; Cash Flowi,j,t,
calculated as the sum of operating profit and depreciation and amortization of division j of firm i in year t divided by
the total assets of firm i in year t-1; Tobin’s Qi,j,t, Tobin’s Q of division j of firm i in year t, calculated as the median
Q for single-division firms in segment j’s 2-digit SIC industry in year t, where Q is calculated as the ratio of the
book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity to book value of assets; Cash
Flowi, other, t, calculated as the sum of cash flows of all segments in firm i, except for the cash flows of segment j, in
year t, divided by the total assets of firm i, in year t-1; High Qi,j, t ,a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if
segment j has the highest Tobin’s Q among all segments within firm i in year t, zero otherwise; High Qi, j, t*Cash
Flowi, j, t, the interaction between High Qi,j, t and Cash Flowi,j,t; High Qi, j, t* Cash Flowi, other, t, the interaction between
High Qi,j, t and Cash Flowi, other, t; and Tobin’s Qi, other, t, the highest Tobin’s Q among all segments within firm i,
except for segment j, in year t. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance level at
1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.

Independent Variables
Sales Growthi, j, t
Cash Flowi, j, t
Cash Flowi, other, t
Tobin’s Qi, j, t
High Qi, j, t*Cash Flowi, j, t
High Qi, j, t* Cash Flowi, other, t
Tobin’s Qi, other, t
Segment Fixed Effects
Industry Fixed Effects
Year Dummies
N
R-Squared

Smallest Segment
VIC Q1
VIC Q4
0.0025**
-0.0003
(2.31)
(-0.36)
0.1031***
0.0993***
(8.56)
(6.82)
0.0114**
0.0101**
(2.40)
(2.43)
0.0008
-0.0015
(0.77)
(-1.53)
-0.0262**
-0.0436**
(-1.96)
(-2.56)
0.0055
0.0047
(1.07)
(1.10)
0.0007
0.0008**
(0.93)
(2.10)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
3,860
2,797
0.7337
0.8590
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Largest Segment
VIC Q1
VIC Q4
0.0099***
0.0133***
(3.35)
(4.30)
0.0921***
0.1541***
(7.07)
(10.17)
0.0697***
0.0580***
(3.92)
(3.07)
0.0016
-0.0015
(0.64)
(-0.59)
-0.0011
-0.0148
(-0.09)
(-0.96)
0.0514**
0.0382*
(2.33)
(1.70)
0.0001
0.0002*
(0.56)
(1.74)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
4,439
3,321
0.7357
0.7892

Table 2.5 VIC and ICM Efficiency: Cash Flow-Investment Sensitivity II
This table reports the regression results of model (38) for the smallest and largest segments in the base sample. The
dependent variable is Investmenti,j,t, calculated as the capital expenditure of division j of firm i in year t divided by
the total assets of firm i in year t-1. The independent variables include: VICi, t, calculated using the BEA Benchmark
Use Tables of the years 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2002 and 2007; VICi, t is truncated at 3 to avoid extreme outliers;
Sales Growthi,j,t, calculate as the sales growth of division j of firm i from year t-2 to year t-1; Cash Flowi,j,t,
calculated as the sum of operating profit and depreciation and amortization of division j of firm i in year t divided by
the total assets of firm i in year t-1; Tobin’s Qi,j,t, Tobin’s Q of division j of firm i in year t, calculated as the median
Q for single-division firms in segment j’s 2-digit SIC industry in year t, where Q is calculated as the ratio of the
book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity to book value of assets; Cash
Flowi, other, t, calculated as the sum of cash flows of all segments in firm i, except for the cash flows of segment j, in
year t, divided by the total assets of firm i, in year t-1; High Qi,j, t ,a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if
segment j has the highest Tobin’s Q among all segments within firm i in year t, zero otherwise; High Qi, j, t*Cash
Flowi, j, t, the interaction between High Qi,j, t and Cash Flowi,j,t; VICi, t * High Qi, j, t * Cash Flowi, j, t, the interaction
between VICi, t, High Qi,j, t and Cash Flowi,j,t ; High Qi, j, t* Cash Flowi, other, t, the interaction between High Qi,j, t and
Cash Flowi, other, t; VICi, t * High Qi, j, t * Cash Flowi, other, t, the interaction between VICi, t, High Qi,j, t and Cash Flowi,
other, t; and Tobin’s Qi, other, t, the highest Tobin’s Q among all segments within firm i, except for segment j, in year t.
T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Independent Variables
Sales Growthi, j, t

Smallest Segment
0.0011**
(2.03)
0.1053***
(15.85)
0.0170***
(7.12)
0.0006
(1.05)
0.0004
(0.73)
-0.0088
(-1.12)
-0.0353**
(-2.33)
0.0011
(0.42)
-0.0000
(-0.01)
0.0004
(1.54)
Yes
Yes
Yes
12,672
0.6875

Cash Flowi, j, t
Cash Flowi, other, t
Tobin's Qi, j, t
VICi, t
High Qi, j, t * Cash Flowi, j, t
VICi, t * High Qi, j, t * Cash Flowi, j, t
High Qi, j, t * Cash Flowi, other, t
VICi, t * High Qi, j, t * Cash Flowi, other, t
Highest Qi, other, t
Segment Fixed Effects
Industry Fixed Effects
Year Dummies
N
R-Squared
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Largest Segment
0.0101***
(7.09)
0.1276***
(19.32)
0.0563***
(6.69)
0.0031***
(2.75)
0.0003
(0.32)
-0.0002
(-0.03)
-0.0011
(-0.08)
0.0174*
(1.66)
-0.0319
(-1.60)
0.0001
(1.17)
Yes
Yes
Yes
14,827
0.7094

Table 2.6 VIC and ICM Efficiency: Innovative Efficiency I
This table reports the regression results of models (39) and (40) using the innovation sample. The dependent
variables are R&Di,t, calculated as R&D expenditure divided by the total assets of firm i in year t (I replace missing
R&D expenditure with zero); and Patenti, t, calculated as the number of patents filed by firm i in year t that were
later granted, divided by the mean number of patents in the industry to which firm i belongs in year t. The
independent variables include: VICi,t, calculated using the BEA Benchmark Use Tables of the years 1982, 1987,
1992, 1997, 2002 and 2007; VICi,t greater than 3 is set 3 to avoid extreme outliers; LogATi,t, calculated as the natural
log of firm i’s total assets in year t; Profitabilityi,t, calculated as the ratio EBITDA to total assets of firm i in year t;
Leveragei,t, calculated as the sum of long-term debt and debt in current liability divided by the total assets of firm i
in year t; Market-to-Booki,t, calculated as the ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of equity of firm i
in year t; Cashi,t, calculated as cash divided by the total assets of firm i in year t; Capxi,t, calculated as capital
expenditure divided the total assets of firm i in year t; HHIi,t, the 2-digit SIC industry level Herfindahl index of firm i
in year t; HHI_Squarei, t, the square of HHIi,t; and R&Di,t, calculated as R&D expenditure divided by total assets for
firm i in year t (I replace missing R&D expenditure with zero). T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and
* denote significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Dependent Variable
R&Di, t
Patenti, t
-0.0019***
0.0462**
(-2.59)
(2.45)
0.0022***
0.2467***
(15.09)
(66.29)
-0.1015***
-0.0845
(-47.87)
(-1.46)
-0.0316***
-0.5236***
(-18.67)
(-11.84)
0.0012***
0.0172***
(17.58)
(9.82)
0.0569***
-0.1118
(18.99)
(-1.43)
0.0553***
0.3943***
(11.33)
(3.11)
-0.0151
0.3884
(-0.78)
(0.78)
0.0476
-0.4046
(1.18)
(-0.39)
2.222***
(12.32)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
21,043
21,043
0.4687
0.4240

Independent Variables
VICi, t
LogATi, t
Profitabilityi, t
Leveragei, t
Market-to-Booki, t
Cashi,t
CAPXi, t
HHIi, t
HHI_Squarei, t
R&D
Industry Fixed Effects
Year Dummies
N
R-squared
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Table 2.7 VIC and ICM Efficiency: Innovative Efficiency II
This table reports the regression results of model (41) using the innovation sample. The dependent variable is
Patenti, t, calculated as the number of patents filed by firm i in year t that were later granted, divided by the mean
number of patents in the industry to which firm i belongs in year t. The independent variables include: R&Di,t,
calculated as R&D expenditure divided by the total assets of firm i in year t (I replace missing R&D expenditure
with zero); VICi,t, calculated using the BEA Benchmark Use Tables of the years 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2002 and
2007; VICi,t greater than 3 is set 3 to avoid extreme outliers; R&Di, t * VICi, t, the interaction between R&Di, t and
VICi,t; LogATi,t, calculated as the natural log of firm i’s total assets in year t; Profitabilityi,t, calculated as the ratio
EBITDA to total assets of firm i in year t; Leveragei,t, calculated as the sum of long-term debt and debt in current
liability divided by the total assets of firm i in year t; Market-to-Booki,t, calculated as the ratio of the market value of
equity to the book value of equity of firm i in year t; Cashi,t, calculated as cash divided by the total assets of firm i in
year t; Capxi,t, calculated as capital expenditure divided the total assets of firm i in year t; HHIi,t, the 2-digit SIC
industry level Herfindahl index of firm i in year t; and HHI_Squarei, t, the square of HHIi,t;. T-statistics are reported
in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Independent Variables
VICi, t

Patenti, t
0.0206
(1.03)
1.9606***
(10.19)
2.5157***
(3.90)
0.2465***
(66.25)
-0.0807
(-1.39)
-0.5226***
(-11.82)
0.0171***
(9.77)
-0.1097
(-1.40)
0.3947***
(3.11)
0.3482
(0.70)
-0.3306
(-0.32)
Yes
Yes
21,043
0.4244

R&Di, t
R&Di, t * VICi, t
LogATi, t
Profitabilityi, t
Leveragei, t
Market-to-Booki, t
Cashi, t
CAPXi, t
HHIi, t
HHI_Squarei, t
Industry Fixed Effects
Year Dummies
N
R-squared
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Chapter 3: Why Does Vertical Integration Destroy Firm Value?
3.1 INTRODUCTION
The link between diversification and firm value is the subject of a large literature.
Diversification can have positive effects on firm value if it is associated with greater debt
capacity (Lewellen, 1971), greater operating efficiency (Chandler, 1977), more efficient resource
allocation (Weston, 1970), and/or reduced underinvestment (Stulz, 1990). Oppositely,
diversification could have negative effects on firm value if it creates information asymmetry
between central and division managers (Harris, Kriebel and Raviv, 1982; Myerson, 1982), leads
to value-destroying investments (Jensen, 1986), overinvestment in segments with poor
investment opportunities (Stulz, 1990), and/or cross-subsidization to failing segments (Meyer,
Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). It is therefore not surprising that, empirically, it is not clear
whether diversification is positively or negatively related to firm value. Some studies document a
“diversification discount” (Berger and Ofek, 1995; Comment and Jarrell, 1994; Liebeskind and
Opler, 1993). Others argue that the “diversification discount” is not as severe as documented,
because these earlier studies ignore the endogeneity issue in corporate diversification (Campa
and Kedia, 2002; Marksimovic and Phillips, 2002; Villalonga, 2004). While the valuation effects
of diversification have been extensively studied, differences between various diversification
strategies have received much less attention. Particularly, an often overlooked diversification
strategy is vertical integration, in which (part of) the supply chain is owned by a company and
inter-divisional transactions are an integral part of the firm’s operation. In this light, it is
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important to note that that over 25% of all Compustat firms are multi-division firms and that a
large number of them are substantially vertically integrated.
Theoretically, vertical integration can be motivated as it may reduce transaction costs,
improve incentives, and limit the holdup problem between upstream and downstream firms along
the supply chain, especially when it is difficult to contract (Williamson, 1975, 1985).
Additionally, vertical integration may be a result of financial institution and credit market
imperfections (Acemoglu, Johnson and Mitton, 2009; Kumar, Rajan and Zingales, 1999; Rajan
and Zingales, 1998). Here, a lack of financial development limits the entries of potential
entrepreneurs and the survivors in the market are mostly large firms, which are more likely to
produce their own inputs and/or market their own outputs. This may also explain why capitalintensive industries tend to be more vertically integrated (Acemoglu, Johnson and Mitton, 2009).
Although vertical integration has been studied theoretically, there is limited empirical work that
directly examines its effects on valuation and performance. Somewhat related, there is a strand of
literature that studies the effects of related diversification on firm profitability and value (Amit
and Livnat, 1988; Montegomery, 1982; Palepu, 1985; Rumelt, 1974; Rumelt 1982). These
studies adopt measures of relatedness calculated based on proportional sales of the different SIC
industry groups within the firm (e.g., the Berry-Herfindahl index or the Jacquemin and Berry
(1979) entropy measure). However, the type of relatedness captured by SIC classification is quite
ambiguous. On one hand, segments belonging to the same SIC industry can share inputs and
investment opportunities, which constitutes a lateral relation; on the other hand, they can also be
vertically linked when they engage in internal transactions. Therefore, the relatedness measures
employed in these studies cannot isolate the effects of vertical integration. And given the
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prevalence of vertically integrated firms, this is an important omission in the extant
diversification literature.
In this paper, I examine vertical integration in detail. Specifically, I construct a measure
of vertical integration, and relate it to firm value to investigate the valuation effects of this
diversification strategy. Furthermore, I also explore the channels through which vertical
integration may affect firm value. Using Input-Output accounts of dollar flows between all
industries in the U.S. economy (from the Bureau of Economic Analysis), I construct a vertical
integration coefficient (VIC) to measure the level of vertical integration of a firm, and find that it
is negatively related to firm value. Economically, when I bifurcate the multi-segment firms into
vertically integrated and laterally integrated groups based on the sample median VIC, I find that,
on average, vertically integrated firms experience a significant discount of approximately 1.56%,
relative to laterally integrated firms and compared to firms located in the lowest VIC quartile,
firms located in the highest VIC quartile exhibit a significant discount of approximately 3.34%.
This finding is similar to those reported by Fan and Lang (2000), but their sample period ends in
1997 (based on the 1992 IO tables), whereas my sample period includes a much more recent
sample period (1980-2007 using the IO tables from 1982 to 2007). More importantly, new to the
literature, I also investigate the possible causes of this additional value discount associated with
vertical integration. I argue that a unique feature of vertical integration is the high frequency of
internal transactions. And several types of inefficiencies may arise when divisions engage in
such transactions. First, internal transactions can occur at less favorable prices comparing to the
market price, which leads to lower profitability. Moreover, cross-subsidization from the
profitable divisions to the losing divisions are more likely when the divisions are operationally
linked through internal transactions, which further reduces firm value. Consistent with these
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arguments, I find that vertical integration is associated with lower gross profit margins and more
cross-divisional subsidization.
This study contributes to the literature by filling the void of diversification strategy in the
extant corporate diversification literature. Although, at least dating back to the work of Coase
(1937), a sizable literature examines firm boundaries, diversification activities, and the valuation
effects associated therewith, there is a paucity of research on the differences between various
diversification strategies. The existing literature has provided some evidence on the effects of
related vis-a-vis unrelated diversification, in which the degree of relatedness largely depends SIC
industry classifications, and thus can broadly capture both lateral and vertical inter-divisional
linkages. Yet, very little empirical research has isolated the effects of vertical integration from
other diversification strategies, and no literature investigates the sources of the additional value
discount associated with vertical integration. To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first
to do so. The only existing studies that focus on the effects of vertical integration are Fan and
Lang (2000), and Kumar (2013). However, Kumar (2013) only examines the effects of vertical
integration on division-level productivity; and neither paper investigates the cause of the
valuation difference associated with vertical integration.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the related literature and develops
the main research questions. Section 3.3 describes the sample and variable construction. Sections
3.4 and 3.5 present empirical evidence on the valuation effects of vertical integration, compared
to lateral integration, and the sources of the valuation differences. Section 3.6 provides
robustness tests. Section 3.7 concludes the study.
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3.2 RELATED LITERATURE AND THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT

3.2.1 Diversification and Firm Value
Early literature examining firm diversification focuses on the potential benefits thereof.
For example, Lewellen (1971) argues that due to the imperfect correlation between earnings
streams, diversified firms have reduced default risk and greater debt capacity, which is valuecreating due to the increase of interest tax shield. Additional tax advantages may stem from
diversification as well. Majd and Myers (1987), for example, identify gains arising from tax loss
carryback and carryforwards provisions. These tax benefits will accrue to a diversified firm as
long as one or more segments of a conglomerate experiences losses in some years. Other
potential benefits of diversification may also exist. Weston (1970) argues that diversified firms
allocate resources more efficiently through a larger internal capital market. Built on this
argument, Stulz (1990) contends that a larger internal capital market may reduce
underinvestment and that therefore diversified firms make more positive NPV investments.
Perhaps as a reaction to the increase in corporate refocusing, restructuring, and
divestitures in the 1980s, more recent research focuses on the potential costs associated with
diversification. For example, Harris, Kriebel and Raviv (1982) and Myerson (1982) point out
that the information asymmetry between central and divisional managers may lead to inefficient
resource allocation in diversified firms. Jensen (1986) argues that when lines of business have
access to excess free cash flow and borrowing power, value-destroying investments may be
undertaken. Stulz (1990) raises a similar argument in that overinvestment in segments with poor
investment opportunities may occur in diversified firms. Finally, Meyer, Milgrom and Roberts
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(1992) argue that due to cross-subsidization, unprofitable segments may create greater value
losses for diversified firms as compared to these same firms if they were stand-alone firms. A
number of studies also provide empirical evidence of the value-destroying effects of
diversification (i.e., the diversification discount). Comment and Jarrell (1995) and Liebeskind
and Opler (1992) document that there are positive abnormal returns when firms increase focus.
Berger and Ofek (1995) and Lang and Stulz (1994) also document a negative relation between
several firm-value measures and diversification. More recently, Singhal and Zhu (2013) argue
that, although the likelihood of bankruptcy decreases with diversification, diversified firms still
bear higher bankruptcy costs, as measured by the time spent in Chapter 11 bankruptcy and
inefficient segment investments. They conclude that diversification provides benefits to
managers’ job security, rather than to the firm.
The most recent literature focuses on methodological issues and contends that there may
not be a diversification discount. For example, Marksimovic and Phillips (2002) develop a
profit-maximizing neoclassic model of optimal firm size and growth, and show that compared to
stand-alone firms, multi-segment firms do not exhibit lower resource allocation efficiency but
face different growth opportunities. They also argue that the “diversification discount” is in fact
consistent with profit maximization. Campa and Kedia (2002) argue that the documented
discount of diversified firms is not per se evidence that diversification destroys value, but that
firms choose to diversify. They find a strong negative correlation between a firm’s choice to
diversify and firm value and the diversification discount always decreases, and sometimes turns
into a premium after using fixed effects, instrumental variables, and a Heckman selection model
to control for endogeneity and self-selection. Similarly, Villalonga (2004) argues that, overall,
diversification is not value-destroying after controlling for self-selection. Graham, Lemmon and
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Wolf (2002) study the value effect of diversification in a merger and acquisition setting, and
argue that the reduction in excess value of the acquiring firm occurs because firms acquire
already discounted business units, not because diversification is value-destroying.
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3.2.2 Related vs. Unrelated Diversification
Most of the literature discussed in the previous section investigates value effects
associated with diversification. However, existing literature does not differentiate different
diversification strategies. The effects of related versus unrelated diversification are much more
extensively discussed in the organizational science and management literature. Most studies tend
to measure the degree of business relatedness by “the fraction of a firm’s revenues attributable to
its largest group of somehow related business” (Rumelt, 1982). Some argue that related
diversification is preferential when compared to unrelated diversification. For example, Rumelt
(1974, 1982) argues that related diversification has more positive valuation effects than unrelated
diversification because common skills and resources may create value in related markets.
Montgomery (1982), using different measures of relatedness, also finds that unrelated
diversification is less successful than related diversification. Moreover, using the JacqueminBerry entropy measure of diversification and line-of-business data, Palepu (1985) finds that
firms with predominantly related diversification show significantly higher profit growth than
firms with predominantly unrelated diversification. Amit and Livnat (1988) study the different
risk-return characteristics associated with related and unrelated diversification strategies and find
that related diversification characterizes high risk - high return firms, whereas unrelated
diversification characterizes low risk - low return firms. In addition, Nayyar (1993) points out
that the effects of reputation and economies of scope also lead to better performance of related
diversification.
A central discussion in this literature is how to properly measure business relatedness.
The most dominant diversification measure is the Jacquemin and Berry (1979) entropy measure.
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Used in a large number of studies, this measure comprises of a related diversification component
and an unrelated diversification component. The related diversification within an industry is
calculated as the weighted sum of the shares of each segment within that industry. And industries
are usually defined by SIC codes. For example, it may measure the extent of diversification into
four-digit SIC industries for a given two-digit SIC industry. While this measure captures the
“similarities” or “relatedness” between business segments per se, it does not necessarily capture
inter-divisional vertical links. Segments located in the same two-digit SIC industries may relate
to each other in that they share common resources or skills. Alternatively, business segments can
be interdependent through a supplier-customer relationship. In other words, a diversified firm
can be integrated through internal transactions along the supply chain that is owned internally,
which is not captured by the entropy measure. Other measures of business relatedness include
the cross-correlation between capital expenditure or cash flows of business segments (Ferris,
Kim and Kisabunnarat, 2003). Although these measures, to some level, capture the degree of comovement of divisions, the effects of supply chain relations within the firm is not directly
incorporated.
A more appropriate to measure vertical integration is to use the industry Input-Output
data provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). This data provides trade flows
between approximately 500 industries, accounting for all sectors in the economy. Fan and Lang
(2000) use this data and develop a measure of diversification that can capture the extent of
vertical integration within a firm. In testing their measure, the authors provide evidence that
vertical integration is not always value-enhancing. However, they provide no explanation of their
findings. Using the same measure, Kumar (2013) investigates the costs associated with vertical
integration. He shows that when segments are vertically related, core business may shift
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productivity gains toward itself from other segments, either through its disproportionate
influence on decision making at the headquarters level or by using direct influence on other
segments. Such a mechanism could lead to various inefficiencies. Kumar (2013) uses business
segments as the unit of observation in his study and does not explore the link between vertical
integration and firm value directly. The use of industry Input-Output data is not limited to these
studies. In the merger literature, Fan and Goyal (2006) find that vertical mergers generate
positive wealth effects that are significantly larger than those of diversified mergers. Using the
same data, Ahern and Harford (2014) find that stronger product market connections lead to a
greater incidence of cross-industry mergers.
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3.2.3 Vertical Integration and Firm Value
Although the research described in the previous sections discusses the effects of
diversification and business relatedness on firm value, it does not investigate the valuation
effects of vertical integration vis-à-vis lateral integration. The main difference between these two
strategies is whether the supply chain is internally integrated into the operations of the firm.
Theoretically, there are two primary motives for vertical integration. First, Williamson (1975,
1985) develops a theory of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE). According to this theory,
internal organization of firm activities improves incentives and limits agency costs. As such,
vertical integration is designed to reduce transaction costs and holdup problems between
upstream and downstream firms, especially when it is hard to write long-term contracts. Second,
vertical integration may be related to financial institution and credit market imperfections. This
occurs when the lack of financial development limits entries of potential entrepreneurs. In this
case survivors in the market are mostly large firms, which are more likely to produce their own
inputs or market their own outputs (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Mitton, 2009; Kumar, Rajan and
Zingales, 1999; Rajan and Zingales, 1998). Incorporating both lines of reasoning, Acemoglu,
Johnson, and Mitton (2009) show that vertical integration is more prevalent in countries with
greater contracting costs and in more capital-intensive industries.
In addion to potential benefits of vertical integration, there may be costs associated with
vertical integration. First, as discussed by Kumar (2013), in diversified firms, supporting
segments may be forced to compromise their productivity for the benefits of the core business.
And this problem is more severe in vertically integrated firms as the core business in such firms
can exert greater influence on other segments through internal transactions. Second, when
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segments are ordered to purchase from or to sell to other segments within the same firm, internal
transactions may not occur at the optimal price. Specifically, a segment may be able to supply its
products at a higher price in the market than the price at which it supplies to other divisions in
the same firm. Alternatively, a segment may be able to purchase its inputs at a lower cost from a
market cost leader than the cost it incurs in an internal transaction. In either case, internal
transactions result in lower overall profit margins. Third, because of the lower profit margin
resulted from internal transactions, a vertically integrated firm is more likely to have segment(s)
experiencing losses. Therefore it is more likely that there is a need for cross-subsidization.
Hence, there are possible costs and benefits associated with vertical integration and the
valuation effects are not a priori clear. In this paper I investigate whether the positive or the
negative effects dominate, and I explore what mechanisms may drive these valuation effects.
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3.3 SAMPLE AND VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION

3.3.1 Data and Sample
To construct my sample, I start with all firms listed on the Compustat industry segment
files between 1980 and 2007. 2 As explained later, I construct a firm-level vertical integration
coefficient (VIC), using the segment information and the detailed Use Tables of Benchmark
Input-Output Account, provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) from 1982 to 2007.
I merge VIC with Compustat firm-level financial data and delete observations with missing or
negative total assets, book equity, and/or total sales. I also exclude financial firms (SIC codes
6000 to 6999) and utility firms (SIC codes 4900 to 4999). This procedure results in a sample of
39,865 multi-division firm-years, 105,143 single-division firm-years, and a total of 145,008 firmyear observations between 1980 and 2007.

2

FASB 131 in 1997 changed the focus of segment reporting from industries to internal reporting lines. The main
results do not change when I run our tests using the data for the 1980 to 1997 period.
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3.3.2 Variable Construction

3.3.2.1 Vertical Integration Coefficient (VIC)
I measure the degree of vertical integration using the Benchmark Input-Output tables
between all producers and purchasers published by The BEA. The BEA has published the IO
tables since 1947, primarily based on Economic Census data, and they capture the commodity
flows between industries in the U.S. economy. The IO tables are published every five years with
a five-year delay and the latest IO tables available are for year 2007 (i.e., the IO Tables for year
2012 will be available in 2017). Industries are defined both at the summary level and the detailed
level. At each level, the IO tables include Make Table, Use Table, Direct Requirement Table,
and Total Requirement Table. I use the detailed Use Table for years 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997,
2002, and 2007 as the input for measuring the level of vertical integration. The number of
industries covered in these reports ranges from 411 to 478. For each industry pair i and j, the Use
Tables report the dollar value of i’s output required to produce j’s total output, at the producer’s
price. The Use Table defines industries by SIC code before 1997 and by NAICS code since
1997. SIC codes range from 2-digit to 4-digit, whereas NACIS codes range from 2-digit to 6digit.
To construct VIC, I first divide the segment data into six time periods, 1980-1982, 19831987, 1988-1992, 1993-1997, 1998-2002, and 2003-2007, and apply the six Use Tables to each
time period, accordingly. Specifically, for each division within a multi-division firm, I create a
pair with each of the other divisions in the same firm. For example, within a firm, A, with three
divisions, x, y, and z, there will be six division pairs, xy, xz, yx, yz, zx, and zy. Then I match the
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Use Table data to each division pair by the divisions’ industry codes. This procedure allows me
to obtain the dollar value of commodities transferred between each division-pair’s industries. To
illustrate, suppose that axy denotes the dollar value of division y’s industry’s output purchased by
division x’s industry to produce its total output. I divide axy by the dollar value of division x’s
industry’s total output to get vxy. vxy is the dollar value of division y’s industry’s output required
to produce one dollar’s worth of output in division x’s industry. I also calculate vxz, vyx, vyz, vzx,
and vzy following the same procedure. Then I take the weighted average of vxy and vxz to obtain
Vx, with the weights being the sales of division y and division z. Vx represents the dollar value of
output of the industries that all the other divisions in firm A belong to, required to produce one
dollar’s worth of output in division x’s industry. Similarly, I calculate Vy and Vz. And the vertical
integration coefficient (VIC) of firm A is the maximum of Vx, Vy and Vz, VICA = max {Vx, Vy ,Vz}.
To maximize and obtain the most accurate match between the segment file and the Use Tables, I
start the matching with the divisions’ primary NACIS or SIC codes first, and change to the
divisions’ secondary NACIS or SIC codes if no match can be found using the primary industry
codes. Similarly, I first match using the narrowest industry codes (6-digit NAICS or 4-digit SIC
codes) and gradually loosen this matching criterion to the broadest industry codes (2-digit
NACIS or 2-digit SIC codes).
VIC describes the strongest customer-supplier relationship that exists between different
divisions within the same firm. For single-division firms, VIC equals zero. There are several
important issues to note with regards to VIC. First, VIC is usually between 0 and 1, however, a
VIC greater than 1 may occur. For example, in industries with high-levels of inventory, where
not all output of production is realized in sales, the dollar value of input purchased may be
greater than the dollar value of sales realized, which results in VIC greater than 1. Second, to get
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vxy, I divide axy by the dollar value of total output of division x’s industry, and I calculate total
output of division x’s industry by summing up this industry’s sales to all the other industries in
the economy recorded in the Use Table. But for industries that mostly produce consumer
products or services, which are directly supplied to end consumers, this calculation may result in
very low total output, for example, the retail or health care industries. Therefore, for such
industries, the calculated VIC can be greater than 1. In my final sample, less than 1% of the
observations have a VIC greater than 1. Nevertheless, I set VIC to 3 for values greater than 3, to
avoid extreme outliers. Based on VIC, I classify multi-division firms in the sample into two
groups. For each year, if a firm’s VIC is above the median, the firm is classified as Vertical
Integration for that year, Lateral Integration otherwise.
Table 3.1 presents the mean VIC of the full sample, and the mean and median of the
multi-division sample, and the number of observations of each sample, over time. The highest
mean VIC of the full sample and multi-division sample occurs in 1980, when the mean VIC of
the full sample is 0.1003 and the mean VIC of the multi-division sample is 0.3652. The lowest
mean VIC of the full sample and multi-division sample are 0.0110 and 0.0437, respectively,
observed in year 2003. The median VIC of the multi-division sample shows a different
distribution. For this subsample, the highest median VIC is 0.0474, which occurs in year 1994,
whereas the lowest median VIC is 0.0061, which occurs in year 1987.
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3.3.2.2 Firm Value
I employ two measures of firm value in this study. Following, Lang and Stulz (1994), I
construct the first measure, labeled Tobin’s q. Tobin’s q is calculated as the sum of the market
value of common stocks and the book value of debt and preferred stocks, divided by the book
value of total assets. Following Berger and Ofek (1995) and Campa and Kedia (2002) I also
construct a measure based on the percentage difference between a firm’s total value and the sum
of imputed values for its divisions as stand-alone units. To calculate a division’s imputed value, I
multiply the division’s sales by the 3-digit SIC industry median capital-to-sales multiplier. The
median capital-to-sales multiplier is the median ratio of capital to sales of all single-division
firms in the particular 3-digit SIC industry a division belongs to, where total capital is calculated
as the sum of the market value of common equity, long-term and short-term debt, and preferred
stocks. A multi-division firm’s imputed value is the sum of the imputed value of all divisions.
The imputed value of a firm represents the value the firm would have if its divisions operated as
stand-alone firms. Then, I calculate ExValue_sale as the logarithm of the ratio of a firm’s actual
total capital to its imputed value calculated based on total sales.
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3.3.2.3 Other Variables
Following Campa and Kedia (2002), I also include several variables in my regressions to
control for firm size, profitability, investment, and leverage. LogAT is the logarithm of total
assets and LogAT1 and LogAT2 are the values of LogAT with one-year and two-year lags,
respectively. EBIT/Sale, EBIT/Sale1, and EBIT/Sale2 are the ratio of earnings before interest and
taxes divided by total sales, and its one-year, and two-year lags. CAPX/Sale, CAPX/Sales1, and
CAPX/Sales2 are the ratio of capital expenditure, divided by total sales, and its one-year, and
two-year lags. Leverage is calculated as the ratio of long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities,
divided by total assets. 3

3

I winsorize firm value and control variables at 1% and 99%.
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3.3.3 Summary Statistics and Univariate Analysis
Table 3.2 presents the summary statistics of the main variables for the full sample, and
subsamples of multi-division firms, single-division firms, Vertical Integration firms, and Lateral
Integration firms. The mean and median of VIC are 0.0381 and 0.0000 for the full sample, and
0.1385 and 0.0222 for the multi-divisional sample. The Vertical Integration subsample has a
mean VIC of 0.2738, with a median of 0.0992, whereas the Lateral Integration subsample has a
mean VIC of 0.0084, with a median of 0.0039.
Consistent with the documented “diversification discount”, multi-division firms (Panel B)
have lower values than single-division firms (Panel C), reflected in the mean and median of both
valuation measures. Also evident from the table is that multi-division firms are larger in size and
have higher leverage. For the single-division sample, the mean (median) of LogAT is 3.8939
(3.8147), and the mean (median) of Leverage is 0.2096 (0.1606), whereas for the multi-division
sample, the mean (median) of LogAT is 5.7477 (5.7319), and the mean (median) of Leverage is
0.2575 (0.2421). The higher leverage of multi-division firms is the consistent with a coinsurance
effect (Lewellen, 1971). Panel D and Panel E of Table 3.2 provide the summary statistics of the
Vertical Integration and Lateral Integration samples. There is evidence that Vertical Integration
firms have lower value, as reflected in Tobin’s q and ExValue_sale. For example, the mean
Tobin’s q is 1.3633 for the Vertical Integration sample and 1.3985 for the Lateral Integration
sample.
To further confirm the statistical significance of the valuation difference, in Table 3.3, I
compare the two valuation measures between Vertical Integration and Lateral Integration using
a univariate t-test. As shown in the table, the means of Tobin’s Q and ExValue_sale of Vertical
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Integration are significantly lower than the means of the Lateral Integration sample firms. The
differences in means for these two measures are significant at 5% level, or better. Overall, the
analysis so far suggests that the costs of vertical integration outweigh the potential benefits and
lead to an additional discount for vertically integrated firms.
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3.3.4 Correlations
Table 3.4 presents the Pearson correlation matrix of the main variables. Not surprisingly,
the two firm value measures are highly correlated. The main focus of this table is the correlations
between VIC and the two firm value variables. VIC has a negative and significant correlation
with Tobin’s q and ExValue_sale. These correlations suggest that vertical integration appears to
be value-destroying. In the next section, I investigate whether these results hold up in a
regression framework.
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3.4 DIVERSIFICATION STRATEGY AND FIRM VALUE

3.4.1 Diversification Discount
I begin the regression analysis by examining the “diversification discount” documented
in the literature. Table 3.5 presents the estimation of the following model using the full sample:

Firm Value i, t = αMulti i, t + βFirm Controls i, t +γIndustry Fixed Effects + ηFirm Fixed Effects +
θYear Dummies

(1),

where Multi is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm reports operations in multiple
business segments, and zero otherwise. Firm Value is measured by Tobin’s q and ExValue_sale,
and Firm Controls is a vector of control variables described in Section 3.3.2.3. Following
Campa and Kedia (2002), I include firm fixed effects and year dummies. I also control for
industry fixed effects to account for unobservable industry variables that affect valuation. The
estimation results in Table 3.5 columns (1) and (2) show that comparing to single-division firms,
multi-division firms exhibit a discount of 6.97% (Tobin’s q) to 21.86% (ExValue_sale).
Therefore, there exists a diversification discount in my sample, consistent with the findings in the
extant literature.
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3.4.2 Vertical Integration and Firm Value

To investigate the impact of vertical integration on firm value, I first estimate the
following model using the full sample:

Firm Value i, t = αVertical Integration i, t + βFirm Controls i, t +γIndustry Fixed Effects + ηFirm
Fixed Effects + θYear Dummies

(2),

where Vertical Integration is proxied by VIC. The results using the full sample are shown in
Panel A of Table 3.6. VIC is negatively and significantly related to Tobin’s q and ExValue_sale.
A 1% increase in VIC leads to a discount of approximately 0.07%.
To more directly compare Vertical Integration and Lateral Integration, I limit my
analysis to the multi-division subsample. In Table 3.6 of Panel B, columns (1) and (2) present the
estimates of model (2) using all multi-division firms. As shown in the table, VIC is negatively
related to Tobin’s q and ExValue_sale, although the coefficient on the ExValue variable is not
significant at the 10% level. Economically, a 1% increase in VIC leads to a decrease in firm
value of approximately 0.06% (Tobin’s q).
In untabulated tests, I first measure vertical integration by the dummy variable, Vertical,
which takes the value of 1 if a firm is classified as Vertical Integration as described in section
3.3.2.1, zero otherwise. Vertical is negatively and significantly related with ExValue_sale. The
coefficient on this variable indicates that compared to Lateral Integration, Vertical Integration
exhibits a discount of 1.56%. Furthermore, I limit my sample to only firms located in the top and
bottom VIC quartiles. I define dummy variable HighVertical, which takes the value of 1 if a firm
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locates in the top VIC quartile, zero otherwise. HighVertical is negatively and significantly
related to ExValue_sale. On average, compared to firms located in the bottom VIC quartile, firms
located in the top VIC quartile exhibit a discount of approximately 3.34%.
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3.5 CAUSES OF THE VERTICAL INTEGRATION DISCOUNT

The above analyses suggest the existence of a diversification discount. Furthermore,
comparing to Lateral Integration, Vertical Integration is associated with a further decrease in
value. In this section, I investigate the sources of the additional discount associated with Vertical
Integration.
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3.5.1 Vertical Integration and Profit Margin

One potential reason why Vertical Integration imposes a bigger discount in firm value,
relative to Lateral Integration is that vertically integrated firms may forego optimal market
prices and instead, purchase input and sell output internally at a suboptimal price level. This
argument is similar to the productivity argument raised in Kumar (2013). Kumar (2013) argues
that when firms are vertically related, supporting divisions may be forced to comprise their
productivity for the benefit of the core business. Similarly, when divisions are ordered to
purchase from, or sell to other divisions within the same firm, a compromise has to be made in
terms of price. Specifically, a division may be able to supply its products at a higher price in the
market than the price at which it supplies to other divisions in the same firm. Alternatively, a
division may be able to purchase its inputs at a lower cost from a market cost leader than the cost
it incurs from an internal transaction. When internal transactions are carried out at a suboptimal
prices, a firm’s profit margin will decrease, which in turn will have a negative effect on firm
value.
To test this hypothesis, I first establish the relation between gross profit margin and firm
value. Panel A of Table 3.7 shows the estimates of regressions in which firm value is regressed
on firm gross profit margin and other control variables. I calculate gross profit margin
(GrossMargin) as sales minus cost of goods sold, divided by sales. After controlling for firm and
industry fixed effects and including year dummies, I find that gross profit margin is positively
and significantly related to both measures of firm value. A 1% increase in profit margin leads to
an increase in firm value of approximately 0.02% (Tobin’s q) to 0.03% (ExValue_sale). After
establishing the positive relation between gross profit margin and firm value, I investigate
89

whether there is a relation between vertical integration and gross profit margin. Panel B of Table
3.7 shows the regression estimates. VIC is significantly and negatively related to gross profit
margin. When the level of vertical integration increases by 1%, gross profit margin decreases by
more than 0.08%. And, as gross profit margin is value-enhancing, the lower gross profit margin
of vertically integrated firms leads to lower firm value.
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3.5.2 Vertical Integration and Cross-subsidization

Higher cross-subsidization may also cause the discount associated with Vertical
Integration. According to Meyer, Milgrom and Roberts (1992), an unprofitable segment can
create a bigger loss in a diversified firm than it would as a stand-alone firm because a business
line cannot have negative value as a stand-alone firm, but can have negative value if it is a part of
a conglomerate. Jensen (1989, 1991, and 1993) also provides theoretical support for this crosssubsidization argument. According to Jensen, mechanisms that constrain cross-subsidization in
LBO associations are one important source of their value gain. Cross-subsidization can be more
severe in Vertical Integration than Lateral Integration. The reason is that because of the lower
profit margin resulting from internal transactions, a vertically integrated firm is more likely to
have division(s) experiencing losses. Therefore, it is more likely that there is a need for crosssubsidization. This problem can be mitigated in laterally integrated firms, where internal
transactions are not common.
To investigate whether cross-subsidization imposes a more severe problem in Vertical
Integration than in Lateral Integration, I adopt the approach used in Berger and Ofek (1995).
Specifically, I investigate whether the presence of negative cash flows introduces a more
negative effect on firm value under Vertical Integration than under Lateral Integration. If crosssubsidization is more severe in vertically integrated firms than in laterally integrated firms,
having a negative cash flow division should lead to more negative impact on firm value for
Vertical Integration relative to Lateral Integration. I proxy cash flows using operating income
before depreciation (OIBDPS). Following Berger and Ofek (1995), I first construct a conditional
excess value measure, Conditional_ExValue_sale. Different from Exvalue_sale used in previous
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sections, for the conditional excess value measure, the imputed value of each segment is
calculated separately for divisions with positive OIBDPS and divisions with negative OIBDPS.
The imputed value of divisions with positive OIBDPS is calculated using the median capital-tosales multiplier of single-division firms with positive OIBDPS in a given 3-digit SIC industry
and the imputed value of divisions with negative OIBDPS is calculated using the median capitalto-sales multiplier of single-division firms with negative OIBDPS in a given 3-digit SIC industry.
According to Berger and Ofek (1995), the reason why the conditional excess value measure is
more appropriate for testing the effect of cross-subsidization is that, with the unconditional
excess value measure, actual value is always expected to be less than the imputed value if a
negative cash flow division exists, because market price is a function of discounted cash flows.
However, the conditional excess value measure conditions on the sign of OIBDPS and reflects
the effect of negative cash flows itself on firm value (Berger and Ofek, 1995).
To investigate whether Vertical Integration exhibits more cross-subsidization than
Lateral Integration, I estimate the following model separately for the Vertical Integration
subsample and the Lateral Integration subsample:

Conditional_ExValue_sale = αNegative Cash Flow
Effects + ηFirm Fixed Effects + θYear Dummies

i, t

+ βFirm Controls

i, t

+γIndustry Fixed
(3),

where Negative Cash Flow is proxied by NumNegCF, which is the number of negative cash flow
divisions within a firm, and NegCF, which is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm
has at least one negative cash flow division, zero otherwise. Also, following Berger and Ofek
(1995), I control for LogAT and CAPX/Sale.
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Panel A of Table 3.8 shows the regression estimates. This test is run on the multi-division
subsample and the availability of divisional cash flows has substantially reduced the sample size.
The results show that, both measures of Negative Cash Flow have more negative effects on
Conditional_ExValue_sale for the Vertical Integration subsample than for the Lateral
Integration subsample. One more negative cash flow division leads to a 25.16% discount
measured by Conditional_ExValue_sale under Vertical Integration, but only a 19.21% discount
under Lateral Integration. Furthermore, having negative cash flow division(s) leads to a 42.50%
discount under Vertical Integration, but only 37.72% discount under Lateral integration. To
show the statistical power of the effect that the level of vertical integration has on crosssubsidization, I add an interaction term of Negative Cash Flow with VIC and run the regression
on the multi-division subsample. The result is presented in Table 3.8 Panel B. Consistent with
the results in Panel A, NumNegCF and NegCF are negatively and significantly related to
Conditional_ExValue_sale. Furthermore, the interaction terms are also negative and significant,
indicating that the negative impact on firm value of negative cash flow divisions is further
enhanced by the level of vertical integration. Overall, the results support the argument that crosssubsidization imposes a more severe problem under Vertical Integration than under Lateral
Integration, which leads to a bigger discount for vertically integrated firms.
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3.6 ROBUSTNESS

So far the tests have used VIC to measure the level of vertical integration. Since VIC
measures the strongest inter-divisional vertical relation in a firm, one can argue that this measure
only captures two divisions in a firm and ignores the divisions that may exhibit weaker vertical
links. To address this concern, I adopt an alternative measure of vertical integration, wVIC,
which is the weighted average inter-divisional vertical relation between all divisions within the
firm, using division sales as the weights. In general, wVIC has a lower value than VIC. The mean
and median for the full sample are 0.0225 and 0.0000, whereas the multi-division subsample has
a mean (median) wVIC of 0.0828 (0.0120). I regress Tobin’s q on wVIC using model (2), for
both the full sample and multi-division sample. Table 3.9 reports these regressions. The results
continue to hold. For the full sample, a 1% increase in wVIC leads to a decrease in Tobin’s q of
approximately 0.1%. Similarly, for the multi-division sample, a 1% increase in wVIC leads to an
approximately 0.07% decrease in Tobin’s q. Overall, the discount associated with vertical
integration reported above is robust to the alternative measure of vertical integration.
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3.7 CONCLUSION
My study documents that vertical integration is negatively related to firm value. To be
specific, using a vertical integration coefficient (VIC) constructed with Industry Benchmark
Input-Output accounts of dollar flows between all industries in the U.S. economy provided by
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), I find that compared to laterally integrated firms,
vertical integration is associated with a significant discount of approximately 1.56%. Even more
strikingly, compared to firms located in the lowest VIC quartile, firms located in the highest VIC
quartile exhibit a significant larger discount of 3.34%. This vertical integration discount is robust
to an alternative measure of VIC. I also find that there are two important sources of this
additional discount: lower profit margins and more cross-subsidization.
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Table 3.1 Vertical Integration by Year
This Table presents the mean and median of VIC for the full sample and multi-division sample by year. The full sample consists of 145,008 firm-year
observations between 1980 and 2007 and the multi-division sample consists of 39,865 firm-year observations between 1980 and 2007. VIC is calculated using
BEA Benchmark Use Tables of years 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2002 and 2007. VIC is set to 3 for values greater than 3, to avoid extreme outliers.
Year
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007

N- Full Sample
3,470
3,579
3,809
4,728
4,786
4,943
5,177
5,244
5,185
5,039
5,008
5,158
5,494
5,920
6,266
6,837
7,223
6,994
6,894
6,708
6,466
5,760
5,352
3,940
3,922
3,804
3,680
3,621

Mean- Full Sample
0.1003
0.0927
0.0778
0.0188
0.0172
0.0179
0.0157
0.0151
0.0397
0.0372
0.0365
0.0365
0.0341
0.0331
0.0337
0.0298
0.0284
0.0307
0.0491
0.0616
0.0667
0.0653
0.0682
0.0110
0.0111
0.0112
0.0124
0.0118

N- Multi-division Sample
953
923
922
1,540
1,460
1,374
1,311
1,257
1,329
1,248
1,231
1,221
1,245
1,268
1,276
1,299
1,304
1,332
2,342
2,740
2,670
2,464
2,315
991
982
968
963
937
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Mean- Multi-division Sample
0.3652
0.3593
0.3215
0.0576
0.0563
0.0644
0.0620
0.0630
0.1549
0.1503
0.1485
0.1540
0.1504
0.1547
0.1653
0.1570
0.1571
0.1612
0.1445
0.1509
0.1615
0.1527
0.1577
0.0437
0.0443
0.0442
0.0473
0.0457

Median Multi-division Sample
0.0267
0.0261
0.0253
0.0079
0.0073
0.0071
0.0063
0.0061
0.0202
0.0191
0.0208
0.0184
0.0182
0.0451
0.0474
0.0437
0.0433
0.0459
0.0307
0.0309
0.0338
0.0353
0.0320
0.0159
0.0168
0.0168
0.0168
0.0168

Table 3.2 Summary Statistics
This Table presents summary statistics for the full sample, and the single-division, multi-division, Vertical
Integration, and Lateral Integration subsamples, for the sample period of 1980-2007. VIC is calculated using BEA
Benchmark Use Tables of years 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2002 and 2007. VIC is set to 3 for values greater than 3, to
avoid extreme outliers. Tobin’s q is calculated as the sum of the market value of common stocks and the book value
of debt and preferred stocks divided by the book value of total assets. ExValue_sale is the logarithm of the ratio of a
firm’s actual total capital to its imputed value calculated based on total sales. A multi-division firm’s imputed value
is the sum of the imputed value of all segments. A division’s imputed value is the division’s sales multiplied by the
3-digit SIC industry median capital-to-sales multiplier. The median capital-to-sales multiplier is the median ratio of
capital to sales of all single-division firms in that particular 3-digit SIC industry a division belongs to, where total
capital is calculated as the sum of market value of common equity, long-term and short-term debt, and preferred
stocks. LogAT is the logarithm of total assets. EBIT/Sale is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes divided by
total sales. CAPX/Sale is the ratio of capital expenditure divided by total sales. Leverage is calculated as the ratio of
long-term debt plus debt in current liability divided by total assets.
Panel A: Full Sample
Variable

N

Mean

Median

Std Dev

VIC

145,008

0.0381

0.0000

0.2033

Tobinq

127,048

1.9162

1.1669

2.2646

ExValue_sale

122,503

0.0438

-0.0270

1.1673

LogAT

145,007

4.4035

4.2744

2.3511

EBIT/Sale

140,729

-0.5696

0.0526

3.0929

CAPX/Sale

138,708

0.1909

0.0449

0.5853

Leverage

144,525

0.2227

0.1904

0.2004

N

Mean

Median

Std Dev

39,865

0.1385

0.0222

0.3694

Panel B: Multi-division Sample
Variable
VIC
Tobinq

36,852

1.3815

0.9816

1.4500

ExValue_sale

35,816

-0.2577

-0.2405

0.9869

LogAT

39,865

5.7477

5.7319

2.3209

EBIT/Sale

39,854

-0.0571

0.0647

1.0988

CAPX/Sale

39,261

0.0982

0.0436

0.2700

Leverage

39,730

0.2575

0.2421

0.1832

N

Mean

Median

Std Dev

VIC

105,143

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

Tobinq

90,196

2.1346

1.2856

2.4900

ExValue_sale

86,687

0.1684

0.0000

1.2124

LogAT

105,142

3.8939

3.8147

2.1532

EBIT/Sale

100,875

-0.7721

0.0459

3.5670

CAPX/Sale

99,447

0.2274

0.0457

0.6666

Leverage

104,795

0.2096

0.1606

0.2051

Panel C: Single-division Sample
Variable

Panel D: Vertical Integration Sample
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Variable

N

Mean

Median

Std Dev

VIC

19,211

0.2783

0.0992

0.4953

Tobinq

17,745

1.3633

0.9764

1.3983

ExValue_sale

17,184

-0.2755

-0.2480

0.9765

LogAT

19,211

6.0337

6.0487

2.3466

EBIT/Sale

19,205

-0.0483

0.0649

1.0744

CAPX/Sale

18,879

0.1001

0.0462

0.2664

Leverage

19,137

0.2605

0.2457

0.1812

N

Mean

Median

Std Dev

VIC

20,654

0.0084

0.0039

0.0105

Tobinq

19,107

1.3985

0.9866

1.4963

ExValue_sale

18,632

-0.2413

-0.2315

0.9961

Panel E: Lateral Integration Sample
Variable

LogAT

20,654

5.4817

5.4483

2.2645

EBIT/Sale

20,649

-0.0654

0.0645

1.1211

CAPX/Sale

20,382

0.0965

0.0413

0.2733

Leverage

20,593

0.2547

0.2387

0.1850
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Table 3.3 Univariate Analysis
This table presents the univariate comparison in firm valuation between the Vertical Integration sample and the
Lateral Integration sample, for the sample period of 1980-2007. Tobin’s q is calculated as the sum of the market
value of common stocks and the book value of debt and preferred stocks divided by the book value of total asset.
ExValue_sale is the logarithm of the ratio of a firm’s actual total capital to its imputed value calculated based on
total sales. A multi-division firm’s imputed value is the sum of the imputed value of all divisions. A division’s
imputed value is the division’s sales multiplied by the 3-digit SIC industry median capital-to-sales multiplier. The
median capital-to-sales multiplier is the median ratio of capital to sales of all single-division firms in that particular
3-digit SIC industry a division belongs to, where total capital is calculated as the sum of market value of common
equity, long-term and short-term debt, and preferred stocks. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***, **, and *
denote significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Vertical Integration

Lateral Integration

Difference (Vertical - Lateral)

T-statistic

Tobinq

1.3633

1.3985

-0.0352**

(-2.34)

ExValue_sale

-0.2755

-0.2413

-0.0343***

(-3.28)
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Table 3.4 Correlation Matrix
This Table presents the Pearson Correlations between main variables. VIC is calculated using BEA Benchmark Use
Tables of years 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2002 and 2007. VIC is set to 3 for values greater than 3, to avoid extreme
outliers. Tobin’s q is calculated as the sum of the market value of common stocks and the book value of debt and
preferred stocks divided by the book value of total assets. ExValue_sale is the logarithm of the ratio of a firm’s
actual total capital to its imputed value calculated based on total sales. A multi-division firm’s imputed value is the
sum of the imputed value of all divisions. A division’s imputed value is the division’s sales multiplied by the 3-digit
SIC industry median capital-to-sales multiplier. The median capital-to-sales multiplier is the median ratio of capital
to sales of all single-division firms in that particular 3-digit SIC industry a division belongs to, where total capital is
calculated as the sum of market value of common equity, long-term and short-term debt, and preferred stocks.
LogAT is the logarithm of total assets. EBIT/Sale is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes divided by total
sales. CAPX/Sale is the ratio of capital expenditure divided by total sales. Leverage is calculated as the ratio of longterm debt plus debt in current liability divided by total assets. ***, **, and * denote significance level at 1%, 5% and
10%, respectively.
VIC
VIC

Tobinq

ExValue_sale

LogAT

EBIT/Sale

CAPX/Sale

Leverage

1

Tobinq

-0.0531***

1

ExValue_sale

-0.0423***

0.5344***

1

LogAT

0.1122***

-0.2377***

-0.1059***

1

EBIT/Sale

0.0319***

-0.2800***

-0.4898***

0.1981***

1

CAPX/Sale

-0.0299***

0.1555***

0.4089***

-0.0955***

-0.5609***

1

Leverage

0.0435***

-0.2242***

-0.0684***

0.1919***

0.1097***

-0.0002

100
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Table 3.5 Diversification Discount
This table presents the regression estimates of model (1) using the full sample. Multi is a dummy variable that takes
the value of 1 if a firm reports operations in multiple business segments, and zero otherwise. Tobin’s q is calculated
as the sum of the market value of common stocks and the book value of debt and preferred stocks divided by the
book value of total assets. ExValue_sale is logarithm of the ratio of a firm’s actual total capital to its imputed value
calculated based on total sales. A multi-division firm’s imputed value is the sum of the imputed value of all
divisions. A division’s imputed value is the division’s sales multiplied by the 3-digit SIC industry median capital-tosales multiplier. The median capital-to-sales multiplier is the median ratio of capital to sales of all single-division
firms in that particular 3-digit SIC industry a division belongs to, where total capital is calculated as the sum of
market value of common equity, long-term and short-term debt, and preferred stocks. LogAT is the logarithm of total
assets, and LogAT1 and LogAT2 are the value of LogAT with one-year and two-year lags, respectively. EBIT/Sale,
EBIT/Sale1, EBIT/Sale2 are the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes divided by total sales, and its one-year and
two-year lags. CAPX/Sale, CAPX/Sales1, CAPX/Sales2 are the ratio of capital expenditure divided by total sales,
and its one-year and two-year lags. Leverage is calculated as the ratio of long-term debt plus debt in current liability
divided by total assets. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance level at 1%, 5%
and 10%.
(1)
Tobinq
-0.0697***
(-4.61)
0.2577***
(20.57)
-0.4157***
(-26.00)
-0.2195***
(-19.67)
-0.0373***
(-12.20)
-0.0138***
(-3.98)
-0.0287***
(-8.89)
0.0477***
(3.17)
-0.0435***
(-3.04)
0.0274**
(2.03)
-0.8091***
(-22.86)
Yes
Yes
Yes
106,225
0.5882

Multi
LogAT
LogAT1
LogAT2
EBIT/Sale
EBIT/Sale1
EBIT/Sale2
CAPX/Sale
CAPX/Sale1
CAPX/Sale2
Leverage
Industry Fixed Effects
Firm Fixed Effects
Year Dummy
N
R2
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(2)
ExValue_sale
-0.2186***
(-29.92)
0.4899***
(80.86)
-0.3558***
(-46.03)
-0.1519***
(-28.20)
-0.1250***
(-84.85)
-0.0240***
(-14.39)
-0.0150***
(-9.67)
0.2049***
(28.28)
0.0570***
(8.26)
0.0536***
(8.26)
-0.0001
(-0.01)
Yes
Yes
Yes
105,217
0.7223

Table 3.6 Vertical Integration and Firm Value
This table presents the regression estimates of model (2) using the full sample (Panel A), and the multi-division
sample (Panel B). VIC is calculated using BEA Benchmark Use Tables of years 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2002 and
2007. VIC is set to 3 for values greater than 3, to avoid extreme outliers. Tobin’s q is calculated as the sum of the
market value of common stocks and the book value of debt and preferred stocks divided by the book value of total
asset. ExValue_sale is the logarithm of the ratio of a firm’s actual total capital to its imputed value calculated based
on total sales. A multi-division firm’s imputed value is the sum of the imputed value of all divisions. A division’s
imputed value is the division’s sales multiplied by the 3-digit SIC industry median capital-to-sales multiplier. The
median capital-to-sales multiplier is the median ratio of capital to sales of all single-division firms in that particular
3-digit SIC industry a division belongs to, where total capital is calculated as the sum of market value of common
equity, long-term and short-term debt, and preferred stocks. LogAT is the logarithm of total assets, and LogAT1 and
LogAT2 are the value of LogAT with one-year and two-year lags, respectively. EBIT/Sale, EBIT/Sale1, EBIT/Sale2
are the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes divided by total sales, and its one-year and two-year lags.
CAPX/Sale, CAPX/Sales1, CAPX/Sales2 are the ratio of capital expenditure divided by total sales, and its one-year
and two-year lags. Leverage is calculated as the ratio of long-term debt plus debt in current liability divided by total
assets. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%.
Panel A: Full Sample
(1)

(2)

Tobinq

ExValue_sale

-0.0683***

-0.0700***

(-3.03)

(-6.35)

LogAT

0.2547***

0.4798***

(20.37)

(78.96)

LogAT1

-0.4165***

-0.3585***

(-26.05)

(-46.16)

LogAT2

-0.2204***

-0.1555***

(-19.76)

(-28.75)

EBIT/Sale

-0.0374***

-0.1254***

(-12.25)

(-84.75)

EBIT/Sale1

-0.0137***

-0.0238***

(-3.96)

(-14.15)

EBIT/Sale2

-0.0285***

-0.0144***

(-8.83)

(-9.23)

0.0485***

0.2079***

(3.23)

(28.55)

-0.0426***

0.0601***

(-2.97)

(8.66)

0.0287**

0.0581***

(2.13)

(8.91)

-0.8135***

-0.0148

(-23.00)

(-0.86)

Industry fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Firm fixed effects

Yes

Yes

VIC

CAPX/Sale
CAPX/Sale1
CAPX/Sale2
Leverage
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Year dummies

Yes

Yes

N

106,225

105,217

0.5881

0.7197

(1)

(2)

R

2

Panel B:Mmulti-division Subsample

VIC
LogAT

Tobinq

ExValue_sale

-0.0635***

-0.0141

(-3.46)

(-1.15)

0.2470***

0.4724***

(13.00)

(37.51)

-0.3618***

-0.3782***

(-15.23)

(-24.04)

LogAT2

-0.1146***

-0.0835***

(-6.73)

(-7.41)

EBIT/Sale

-0.0840***

-0.1086***

(-7.96)

(-15.70)

EBIT/Sale1

-0.0183*

-0.0329***

(-1.80)

(-4.93)

EBIT/Sale2

0.0239***

0.0186***

(2.75)

(3.23)

0.0475

0.3267***

LogAT1

CAPX/Sale

(1.31)

(13.69)

-0.0706**

0.0751***

(-2.14)

(3.44)

CAPX/Sale2

0.0857***

0.0841***

(2.79)

(4.16)

Leverage

-0.6206***

0.2330***

(-12.22)

(6.90)

Yes

Yes

CAPX/Sale1

Industry fixed effects
Firm fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Year dummies

Yes

Yes

N

34462

33473

0.6578

0.7155

R

2
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Table 3.7 Vertical Integration and Profit Margin
This table presents the results of the regression analysis of vertical integration and profit margin. In Panel A, firm
value variables are regressed on GrossMargin and control variables. In Panel B, GrossMargin is regressed on VIC
and control variables. GrossMargin is sales minus cost of goods sold divided by sales. VIC is calculated using BEA
Benchmark Use Tables of years 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2002 and 2007. VIC is set to 3 for values greater than 3, to
avoid extreme outliers. Tobin’s q is calculated as the sum of the market value of common stocks and the book value
of debt and preferred stocks divided by the book value of total assets. ExValue_sale is the logarithm of the ratio of a
firm’s actual total capital to its imputed value calculated based on total sales. A multi-division firm’s imputed value
is the sum of the imputed value of all divisions. A division’s imputed value is the division’s sales multiplied by the
3-digit SIC industry median capital-to-sales multiplier. The median capital-to-sales multiplier is the median ratio of
capital to sales of all single-division firms in that particular 3-digit SIC industry a division belongs to, where total
capital is calculated as the sum of market value of common equity, long-term and short-term debt, and preferred
stocks. LogAT is the logarithm of total assets, and LogAT1 and LogAT2 are the value of LogAT with one-year and
two-year lags, respectively. EBIT/Sale, EBIT/Sale1, EBIT/Sale2 are the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes
divided by total sales, and its one-year and two-year lags. CAPX/Sale, CAPX/Sales1, CAPX/Sales2 are the ratio of
capital expenditure divided by total sales, and its one-year and two-year lags. Leverage is calculated as the ratio of
long-term debt plus debt in current liability divided by total assets. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***, **,
and * denote significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Panel A: Gross Margin and Firm Value

GrossMargin
LogAT
LogAT1
LogAT2
EBIT/Sale
EBIT/Sale1
EBIT/Sale2
CAPX/Sale
CAPX/Sale1
CAPX/Sale2
Leverage
Industry fixed effects
Firm fixed dffects
Year dummies
N
R2

(1)
Tobinq
0.0157**
(2.02)
0.2540***
(20.31)
-0.4162***
(-26.03)
-0.2208***
(-19.79)
-0.0439***
(-9.90)
-0.0139***
(-4.00)
-0.0286***
(-8.85)
0.0487***
(3.24)
-0.0420***
(-2.93)
0.0291**
(2.16)
-0.8139***
(-23.01)
Yes
Yes
Yes
106,225
0.5881

(2)
ExValue_sale
0.0308***
(8.20)
0.4787***
(78.79)
-0.3576***
(-46.05)
-0.1559***
(-28.84)
-0.1382***
(-64.35)
-0.0241***
(-14.35)
-0.0146***
(-9.33)
0.2081***
(28.60)
0.0612***
(8.82)
0.0587***
(9.00)
-0.0151
(-0.88)
Yes
Yes
Yes
105,217
0.7198

Panel B: VIC and Gross Margin
GrossMargin
VIC

-0.0844***
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(-5.14)
LogSale

0.5328***

Industry fixed effects

Yes

Firm fixed effects

Yes

Year dummies

Yes

N

140736

(151.16)

R

2

0.6505
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Table 3.8 Vertical Integration and Cross-subsidization
This table presents the regression analysis of vertical integration and cross-subsidization. Panel A presents the
regression estimates of model (3), using the Vertical Integration subsample and Lateral Integration subsample.
Panel B presents the regression estimates with interaction terms using the multi-division subsample. The dependent
variable Condition_ExValue_sale is calculated based on the imputed value of each division that is calculated
separately for divisions with positive OIBDPS and divisions with negative OIBDPS. The imputed value of divisions
with positive OIBDPS is calculated using the median capital-to-sales multiplier of single-division firms with
positive OIBDPS in a given 3-digit SIC industry and the imputed value of divisions with negative OIBDPS is
calculated using the median capital-to-sales multiplier of single-division firms with negative OIBDPS in a given 3digit SIC industry. NumNegCF is the number of negative cash flow divisions within a firm, and NegCF is a dummy
variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm has at least one negative cash flow division, zero otherwise. LogAT is the
logarithm of total asset. CAPX/Sale is the ratio of capital expenditure divided by total sales. NumNegCF*VIC and
NegCF*VIC are the interactions between NumNegCF, NegCF and VIC. VIC is calculated using BEA Benchmark
Use Tables of years 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2002 and 2007. VIC is set to 3 for values greater than 3, to avoid
extreme outliers. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance level at 1%, 5% and
10%, respectively.
Panel A
Dependent Variable: Conditional_ExValue_sale
Vertical
(1)
NumNegCF
-0.2516***
(-11.84)
NegCF
LogAT
CAPX/Sale
Industry Fixed Effects
Firm Fixed Effects
Year Dummy
N
R2

0.1182***
(10.24)
0.4793***
(14.99)
Yes
Yes
Yes
16,776
0.7425

(2)

-0.4250***
(-11.54)
0.1172***
(10.15)
0.4818***
(15.07)
Yes
Yes
Yes
16,776
0.7424

Lateral
(3)
-0.1921***
(-7.67)

(4)

-0.3772***
(-9.03)
0.1224***
(11.28)
0.4783***
(15.42)
Yes
Yes
Yes
18,268
0.7401

0.1227***
(11.29)
0.4755***
(15.32)
Yes
Yes
Yes
18,268
0.7396

Panel B
Dependent Variable: Conditional_ExValue_sale
(1)
NumNegCF

(2)

-0.1946***
(-11.31)

NumNegFC*VIC

-0.1687***
(-4.23)

NegCF

-0.3724***
(-12.89)

NegCF*VIC

-0.2344***
(-3.14)

LogAT
CAPX/Sale

0.1100***

0.1095***

(15.11)

(15.05)

0.4881***

0.4889***

(24.16)

(24.20)
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Industry fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Firm fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Year dummies

Yes

Yes

N

35044

35044

0.6947

0.6949

R

2
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Table 3.9 Robustness
This table presents the regression estimates of model (2) using the full sample (Column 1), and the multi-division
sample (Column 2). wVIC is calculated using BEA Benchmark Use Tables of years 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2002
and 2007. wVIC is set to 3 for values greater than 3, to avoid extreme outliers. Tobin’s q is calculated as the sum of
the market value of common stocks and the book value of debt and preferred stocks divided by the book value of
total assets. LogAT is the logarithm of total assets, and LogAT1 and LogAT2 are the value of LogAT with one-year
and two-year lags, respectively. EBIT/Sale, EBIT/Sale1, EBIT/Sale2 are the ratio of earnings before interest and
taxes divided by total sales, and its one-year and two-year lags. CAPX/Sale, CAPX/Sales1, CAPX/Sales2 are the
ratio of capital expenditure divided by total sales, and its one-year and two-year lags. Leverage is calculated as the
ratio of long-term debt plus debt in current liability divided by total assets. T-statistics are presented in parentheses.
***, **, and * denote significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Dependent Variable: Tobin's Q
(1)

(2)

Full Sample

Multi-division Sample

-0.0966***

-0.0681**

(-3.00)

(-2.56)

0.2546***

0.2511***

(20.34)

(13.34)

-0.4178***

-0.3613***

(-26.11)

(-15.33)

-0.2194***

-0.1084***

(-19.65)

(-6.42)

-0.0360***

-0.0484***

(-11.73)

(-4.11)

-0.0124***

-0.0091

(-3.56)

(-0.87)

-0.0286***

0.0232***

(-8.85)

(2.62)

0.0502***

0.0465

(3.32)

(1.23)

-0.0401***

-0.0627*

(-2.78)

(-1.81)

0.0263*

0.0827***

(1.94)

(2.67)

-0.8096***

-0.6095***

(-22.88)

(-12.16)

Industry fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Firm fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Year dummies

Yes

Yes

N

105802

34039

0.5893

0.6640

wVIC
LogAT
LogAT1
LogAT2
EBIT/Sale
EBIT/Sale1
EBIT/Sale2
CAPX/Sale
CAPX/Sale1
CAPX/Sale2
Leverage

R

2
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Chapter 4: Conclusion
Corporate diversification has been a long-debated topic in the finance literature. Existing
studies provide a large amount of theoretical arguments and empirical evidence on the benefits
and costs of diversification. However, in this debate, the differences between diversification
strategies have not received much attention. To fill this gap in the literature, my dissertation
investigates the advantages and disadvantages of a particular diversification strategy: vertical
integration. Chapters 2 and 3 focus on two of the most debated topics in the diversification
literature, in the context of vertical integration: the efficiency of the internal capital market in
capital allocation, and the valuation effects of corporate vertical integration.
In Chapter 2, I model the mechanism of how vertical integration helps align the
objectives of corporate internal agents with the objective of the firm, and thus mitigates the
capital misallocation problem caused by the various value-destroying behaviors of the selfinterested agents. I also provide empirical evidence that higher level of vertical integration is
associated with lower cash flow-investment sensitivity, and greater innovative efficiency. The
evidence indicates a more efficient ICM created under vertical integration.
In Chapter 3, “Why Does Vertical Integration Destroy Firm Value?”, I continue to
investigate the valuation effect of vertical integration. The literature identifies numerous factors
that contribute to the “diversification discount”, such as inefficient ICM, cross-subsidization, and
higher cost incurred in the bankruptcy procedure, etc. Since firm value is not influenced by a
single factor, the more efficient ICM within vertically integrated firms may not warrantee a
higher firm value. In this chapter, I first document a further discount associated with vertical
integration, versus lateral integration, and then explore the sources of this discount. My empirical
results show that vertically integrated firms are relatively lower valued firms. The difference in
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firm value can be significant. For example, compared to firms located in the lowest VIC quartile,
firms located in the highest VIC quartile exhibit a significant larger discount of approximately
3.34%. I also conduct tests to investigate the reasons of the discount. And I find that the two
important sources of this additional discount associated with vertical integration are lower profit
margins and more cross-subsidization.
Overall, my dissertation sheds light on both sides of corporate vertical integration.
Despite that this diversification strategy facilitates efficient internal resource allocation, it is not
always value-enhancing. Although not directly tested, the practical implication suggested in my
dissertation is that firms should weigh the benefits and costs of vertical integration differently at
various stages of their development. While the advantage of having an efficient internal capital is
more important for firms which are conducting expansion, and face various investment
opportunities associated with high levels of information asymmetry and uncertainty, the costs of
low profit margin and cross-subsidization may prevail when firms enter a more mature stage.
Therefore, it may be justified that mature firms divest losing divisions, to prevent a further
discount in firm value.
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